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INTRODUCTION 
Technological progress is generally cumulative.  Most often, inventors rely 
on the discoveries of others to make a new discovery, and so the new discovery 
is really a combination of the old with the new.  When this occurs, the issue of 
how to allocate intellectual property rights between the former and later 
inventors may arise.  Obviously, there are tradeoffs.1  Granting all the 
intellectual property rights to the first inventor (or inventors, if the later 
inventor relies on multiple prior inventors) removes the incentive for the later 
inventor to make the new discovery because the first inventor would reap all 
the rewards from both the initial and new discoveries.  If the first inventor 
lacks either the expertise or sufficient incentive to make the new discovery, 
there may be no technological progress. 
On the other hand, granting all the intellectual property rights to the later 
inventor may remove at least some of the incentive for the first inventor to 
make the original discovery.  While the first inventor still would have the 
benefit of intellectual property rights from the original discovery, these may 
not be very valuable if the new discovery competes with the original discovery 
or renders it obsolete.  Denying the first inventor intellectual property rights in 
the new discovery could make enough of a difference that the first inventor 
would not have sufficient incentive to make the original discovery in the first 
place.2  Again, there may be no technological progress, especially if the new 
discovery would not have been possible without the original discovery. 
It would appear that allocation of intellectual property rights requires 
consideration of a variety of factors.  One of these might be the relative 
significance of the contributions of the first and second inventors.  Surely, the 
inventor that makes the greater contribution ought to receive the larger share of 
the rewards from cumulative inventions.  An original invention may facilitate a 
later invention in at least three ways.3  In some cases, the later invention might 
not be possible without the first.4  In other cases, the original invention might 
reduce the cost of development of the later invention, or accelerate the later 
invention’s development.5  To the extent that an original invention makes the 
 
 1. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) (“The challenge is to reward early 
innovators fully for the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward 
later innovators adequately for their improvements and new products as well.”). 
 2. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential 
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 20 (1995) (“[T]he social value of an early innovation includes 
the net social value of the applications it facilitates.  If the first innovator does not collect that 
value as profit, he might not invest even if the combined profit of the innovations exceeds the 
combined costs.”). 
 3. See Scotchmer, supra note 1, at 31. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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development of a later invention possible, cheaper, or faster, the social value of 
the original invention would include a portion of the later invention’s value, 
and the intellectual property rights to the second invention should be allocated 
to the original inventor accordingly.6  Another factor might be the payoffs the 
first and second inventors need to recover their costs of making their respective 
discoveries.7  Depending on the specific circumstances, these factors may be 
more or less difficult to ascertain. 
Copyright law awards all the intellectual property rights to the first creator 
of an original work of authorship and no copyright to a creator of a derivative 
work made without the permission of the first creator.8  In contrast, patent law 
authorizes an inventor of an improvement to an original invention to obtain a 
patent on the improvement, provided that the improvement satisfies the 
standards for patentability.9  A possible reason for this difference is that the 
range of potential works of authorship is greater than the range of 
improvements for inventions.  The range of potential works of authorship is 
limited only by the imagination of the author.  The author of a screenplay 
about a sports figure does not have to use the character of Rocky Balboa, for 
example, but is free to make up an original character, while Sylvester Stallone 
retains all the rights to develop derivative works based on the Rocky 
character.10  Thus, the ability of later authors to obtain intellectual property 
rights for their new works of authorship is not irretrievably constrained by 
awarding all the intellectual property rights to the first creator of an original 
work of authorship.  Patentable inventions, on the other hand, are constrained 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Green & Scotchmer, supra note 2, at 21. 
 8. See, e.g. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 522 (7th Cir. 2009) (“To 
be copyrightable, a derivative work must not be infringing.”); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning 
L.L.C., 386 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the owner of the original copyright has the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works, the creator of an original derivative work is only 
entitled to a copyright if she had permission to use the copyrighted work.”).  Damages for 
copyright infringement, however, are limited to the amount of the infringer’s profits attributable 
to the original work.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover . 
. . any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement . . . .”); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 396 (1940) (“[I]n computing an award of profits against 
an infringer of a copyright, there may be an apportionment so as to give to the owner of the 
copyright only that part of the profits found to be attributable to the use of the copyrighted 
material as distinguished from what the infringer himself has supplied.”). 
 9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (authorizing inventor of “any new and useful improvement” 
of an invention to obtain a patent for the improvement). 
 10. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
58 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:55 
by the laws of nature, because they must actually work to be patentable.11  An 
inventor is not as free to make up an improvement that does not rely on an 
original invention as a later author is to create a work of authorship that does 
not rely on an original work of authorship.  Accordingly, there may be greater 
justification for awarding intellectual property rights to the inventor of an 
improvement than there is for awarding them to the author of a derivative 
work.12 
While an inventor of an improvement to an original invention may receive 
a patent, the patent on the improvement could potentially be subject to a patent 
on the original invention.  In these circumstances, neither the inventor of the 
improvement nor the inventor of the original invention would be allowed to 
make, use, offer to sell, or sell the improvement without the consent of the 
other.13  The patent on the improvement would block the inventor of the 
original invention from practicing the improvement without permission of the 
improvement’s inventor, and if the improvement is within the scope of the 
patent on the original invention, the patent on the original invention would 
block the improvement’s inventor from practicing the improvement without 
permission of the inventor.14  Third parties who wish to practice the invention 
on the improvement would have to get permission from both inventors.  
Consequently, the first and second inventors would share the intellectual 
property rights in the patent on the improvement with the allocation of the 
licensing revenue left to negotiation between them.15 
 
 11. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring inventions to be useful); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) 
(requiring patent applications to contain a written description of the invention that enables a 
person of ordinary skill in the area to make and use the invention). 
 12. For a more thorough analysis of the different treatments of improvements to inventions 
in patent law and derivative works in copyright law, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).  Professor Lemley calls 
the reason presented in the text for the differing treatment of improvements under patent and 
copyright law the “different works” argument.  Id. at 1034–38.  He also considers three additional 
justifications for the differing treatment that he calls the moral rights, balance of power, and 
market power arguments.  Id. at 1031–34, 1038–42.  He ultimately rejects all these arguments and 
concludes that copyright law should be modified to conform more closely to the patent law 
approach for allocating intellectual property rights in improvements.  Id. at 1044, 1069, 1084. 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 14. Lemley, supra note 12, at 1000–01. 
 15. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case 
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81 (1994) (“An independent patent on an improvement 
. . . facilitates improver-pioneer bargaining.”).  In the context of injunctive relief in litigation, the 
allocation of profits between first and second inventors might be accomplished through 
conditioning the issuance of injunctive relief on the payments between the inventors.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (authorizing a federal court to grant injunctive relief for patent infringement 
“on such terms as the court deems reasonable”). 
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The situation is an example of a bilateral monopoly in which two parties 
have to bargain with each other over something of value.16  In the absence of a 
market to determine a price within the bargaining range, the parties to a 
bilateral monopoly may incur substantial costs to arrive at a settlement point, 
or they could be unable to settle with each other at all.17  Similarly, two 
inventors with blocking patents may be unable to agree on the allocation of 
their intellectual property rights in the improvement with the result that neither 
they nor any third parties would be able to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the 
improvement.  Blocking patents could therefore interfere with technological 
progress.18 
Whether a patent on an original invention blocks a patent on a later 
invention depends on the scope of the patent on the original invention and 
whether the later invention comes within the scope of the patent on the original 
invention.  The scope of a patent generally depends on its claims, which are 
found at the end of the specification in the patent application and the issued 
patent.19  Usually a patent attorney will draft patent claims as broadly as 
possible in order to maximize the coverage.  There are a number of constraints, 
however, on the scope of claims available to a patent drafter. 
On the one hand, the scope is constrained by the prior art in the field. The 
requirement of “novelty,” for example, bars claims from encroaching on 
inventions that were known or used by others in the United States, or that were 
described in a printed publication anywhere in the world before the patent 
applicant’s own invention.20  In addition, the requirement of “nonobviousness” 
bars claims for an invention whose differences from the prior art are such that 
the new invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art at the time the patent applicant first made the invention.21 
 
 16. For discussions of bilateral monopoly, see In re Hopkins, 102 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 
1996) (Posner, J.), abrogated on other grounds by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 
U.S. 953 (1997); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Posner, J.); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62, 597–98 (7th ed. 2007). 
 17.  Walgreen, 966 F.2d at 276. 
 18. For examples of blocking patents interfering with progress in the early electrical lighting 
industry and the development of automobile, aircraft, and radio technology, see Robert P. Merges 
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885–
93 (1990). 
 19. The patent case law has also developed a doctrine of equivalents, which in some cases 
may extend the range of a patent beyond the literal scope of the claims.  The additional range 
from the doctrine of equivalents is limited to insubstantial variations that perform the same 
function in substantially the same way to produce the same result as the original invention, and it 
is therefore dependent on the literal scope of the claims.  For additional discussion of the doctrine 
of equivalents, see infra text accompanying notes 163–83. 
 20. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 21. See id. § 103(a). 
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On the other hand, the scope of claims is constrained by the disclosures 
that the patent applicant makes in the specification in the patent application.  
The specification is required to provide a written description of the invention, 
as well as the process for making and using it, that is sufficient to enable any 
person who is skilled in the art to make and use the invention.22  In addition, 
the specification must elaborate the best mode for carrying out the invention 
that the inventor contemplated.23 
It would seem that combining the enablement requirement for an original 
patent with the nonobviousness requirement for a later patent would preclude 
the possibility that the original patent could block the later patent.24  If the first 
inventor failed to provide a written description that enabled any person skilled 
in the art to make and use the later invention, then the enablement requirement 
would bar the first inventor from including the later invention in the claims in 
the original patent.  The original patent consequently would not block the later 
patent because the later patent would be outside the original patent’s scope.  
On the other hand, if the first inventor did provide a written description that 
enabled a person skilled in the art to make and use the later invention without 
undue experimentation, then the original patent would have been part of the 
prior art with respect to the later invention.  So the second patent would be 
invalid on account of the nonobviousness requirement. 
Despite this syllogism, the existence of blocking patents has long been 
recognized by the courts as well as by academic commentators.25  One 
common circumstance where blocking patents may occur is where the 
improvement to a prior invention consists of the combination of a component 
with the prior invention.26  If the prior invention is represented as “A,” then the 
improvement may be represented as “A + B.”27  Even though the combination 
may be patentable if it is nonobvious, a patent on the prior invention will block 
practice of the combination, because the practice of the combination 
 
 22. See id. § 112. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope Into After-Arising 
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 511 
(2008) (“Whenever there are blocking patents, the literal scope of N’s earlier or ‘dominant’ claim 
reaches beyond what N actually invented and encompasses the things produced by N+1’s later or 
‘subservient’ invention.”); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations 
on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379–80 n.73 (1992) (describing the 
possibility that an improvement invention may be both nonobvious and infringing as a 
conundrum). 
 25. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 18, at 861 n.96. 
 26. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 1009 (“[A]dding to an infringing machine does not relieve 
a defendant of liability for an infringement.”).  For an example of blocking patents resulting from 
the combination of a component with a prior invention, see infra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
 27. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
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necessarily entails infringement of the patent on the prior invention.28  An 
example might be the combination of a pencil with an eraser.  Assuming that a 
patent on the pencil was valid, the combination of the pencil with an eraser 
might also satisfy the requirements for patentability, but the combination could 
not be made or used without infringing the patent on the pencil.29  
Consequently, the patent on the prior invention will dominate a patent on the 
combination.  Moreover, under the “entire market value rule,” damages for 
infringement of a prior invention will not be allocated between the prior 
invention and a component, but rather, will be based on the profits from sales 
of the combination as long as the combination of the prior invention with the 
component constitute a functional unit.30 
In most situations, the development of the combination would likely not 
have been possible without the prior invention, and, therefore, it is appropriate 
for a patent on the prior invention to be allocated substantial intellectual 
property rights in the subsequent combination.  It is conceivable, however, that 
the development of the combination may have occurred independently of the 
prior invention.31  If the prior invention did not make the development of the 
combination possible, cheaper, or faster, allocating intellectual property rights 
in the combination might not be appropriate from an economic standpoint. 
Another circumstance where blocking patents may occur is where one 
patent is on a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, and another 
patent exists for a process to make or use the machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.  This possibility for blocking patents arises from the 
disjunctive elements for infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): “[W]hoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention . . . during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”32  
An inventor of a novel, useful, and nonobvious process for using or making a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter would be entitled to a patent 
for the process, even if the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
 
 28. Id.; Lemley, supra note 12, at 1009 (“Thus, if the improvement consists of additions to 
the basic structure claimed in the original patent, that improvement will not avoid infringement 
even though it would not have been obvious to the original patentee.”). 
 29. I am indebted to Mark Lemley for this illustration. 
 30. Cf. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A 
patentee may recover lost profits on unpatented components sold with a patented item, a 
convoyed sale, if both the patented and unpatented products ‘together were considered to be 
components of a single assembly or parts of a complete machine, or they together constituted a 
functional unit.’” (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
1995))); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 31. For the example of polypropylene, see infra text accompanying notes 187–229 and 338–
43. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
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was subject to its own patent.33  Nevertheless, the patent on the process could 
not be exploited without a license from the patentee of the patent on the 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.  Under § 271(a), any process 
for making or using a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
would infringe the patent on the machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, regardless of whether the process for making or using the patented 
invention was itself novel and nonobvious.34 
Judge Rader provided the following hypothetical illustrating blocking 
patents on a composition for shoe polish and a process for using the 
composition to grow hair in Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc.: 
Inventor A invents a shoe polish for shining shoes (which, for the sake of 
example, is novel, useful, and nonobvious).  Inventor A receives a patent 
having composition claims for shoe polish.  Indeed, the preamble of these 
hypothetical claims recites “a composition for polishing shoes.”  Clearly, 
Inventor B could not later secure a patent with composition claims on the same 
composition because it would not be novel.  Likewise, Inventor B could not 
secure claims on the method of using the composition for shining shoes 
because the use is not a “new use” of the composition but, rather, the same use 
shining shoes. 
  Suppose Inventor B discovers that the polish also repels water when 
rubbed onto shoes.  Inventor B could not likely claim a method of using the 
polish to repel water on shoes because repelling water is inherent in the normal 
use of the polish to shine shoes.  In other words, Inventor B has not invented a 
“new” use by rubbing polish on shoes to repel water.  Upon discovering, 
however, that the polish composition grows hair when rubbed on bare human 
skin, Inventor B can likely obtain method claims directed to the new use of the 
composition to grow hair.  Hence, while Inventor B may obtain a blocking 
patent on the use of Inventor A’s composition to grow hair, this method patent 
does not bestow on Inventor B any right with respect to the patented 
 
 33. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (“The term ‘process’ . . . includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”).  Before the adoption of this 
provision in 1952, a new use of an old product or composition was held to be not patentable.  
Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“It is no new invention to use an old machine for a new 
purpose.  The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, 
no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”); In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 
(C.C.P.A. 1943) (“[A] patent for a new use for an old substance quite unchanged is not authorized 
by the patent laws because such use is not the invention or discovery of ‘any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof’ as 
required by Section 4886 of the Revised Statutes, U.S.C. Title 35, Sec. 31, 35 U.S.C.A. § 31.”); 
Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 768, 
775–80 (1969). 
 34. Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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composition.  Even though Inventor A’s claim recites “a composition for 
polishing shoes,” Inventor B cannot invoke this use limitation to limit Inventor 
A’s composition claim because that preamble phrase states a use or purpose of 
the composition and does not impose a limit on Inventor A’s claim.35 
Thus, a patent for a composition or product will dominate patents for processes 
for making or using the composition or product. 
As a matter of logic, the existence of a product would be essential to the 
development of a process for using the product.  Thus, it makes economic 
sense to allocate substantial intellectual property rights in the process to the 
holder of the patent on the product.  It is less clear, however, that the holder of 
the patent on the product should be allocated substantial intellectual property 
rights in a novel and nonobvious process for making the product.  The 
enablement requirement for a patent on a product is satisfied if the 
specification enables any method of making and using the product.36  In 
contrast, the enablement requirement for a patent on a process for making or 
using a product would not be satisfied unless the specification enabled the 
particular process that was claimed.37  It is certainly possible that one process 
for making a product could be developed independently of another process for 
making the product.  If the first process for making the product did not make 
the second process possible, cheaper, or faster in any way, it would probably 
not be appropriate from an economic standpoint to allocate substantial 
intellectual property rights in the second process to the product’s patent holder.  
Nevertheless, § 271(a) makes any subsequently developed process for making 
or using a patented product subject to the product’s patent.38 
It has been argued that a third circumstance where blocking patents may 
occur is when an inventor makes a broad claim to an entire class (or genus) of 
products after producing only a single member of the class (or species).  
Several commentators have urged that the broad claim to the genus should be 
allowed if the species produced by the inventor was the only species in the 
genus that was known at the time the inventor filed the patent, and that the 
 
 35. Id. at 809–10 (citation omitted). 
 36. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Lab., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Enablement does not require the inventor to foresee every means of implementing an invention 
at pains of losing his patent franchise.”).  See also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
314 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law makes clear that the specification need teach 
only one mode of making and using a claimed composition.” (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 160 (D. Mass. 2001)); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode 
of making and using the claimed invention.”). 
 37. See Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1071. 
 38. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (noting that there is no restriction to processes known or 
claimed). 
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patent should then dominate subsequent nonobvious inventions of other 
species within the claimed genus.39  The scope of the claim to the genus would 
grow over time as new species were invented to populate the genus. 
This third circumstance appears to conflict with the reward theory for 
patent protection.  Under the traditional view, the patent system operates under 
a reward theory in which an inventor is given an exclusive right to practice an 
invention in order to capture returns from the investment in research and 
development in exchange for full disclosure of the invention so that the public 
may use the invention after expiration of the patent’s term.40 
Edmund Kitch has challenged this traditional view with an alternative 
theory that he named the “prospect theory.”41  Under the prospect theory, the 
scope of a patent should extend beyond what the inventor accomplished to 
cover improvements to the invention that are later developed by others.42  
Professor Kitch argued that the prospect theory would enhance public welfare 
by allowing unified control over the development of the invention to the 
original inventor, thereby providing the original inventor with greater 
incentives to make investments without fear that the fruits of the invention will 
be appropriated by competitors.43  Thus, this prospect theory offers a rationale 
for extending the scope of a patent beyond the inventor’s disclosure in the 
patent application. 
In a recent line of decisions, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit appears to have significantly narrowed the permissible scope of patents 
to their disclosures.44  It would seem a likely consequence of the Federal 
 
 39. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 295–97 (4th ed. 2007); Collins, supra note 24, at 532; Lemley, 
supra note 12, at 1009; Merges, supra note 24. 
 40. The Supreme Court provided the following synopsis of the reward theory in Universal 
Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co.: 
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a 
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade 
secret.  But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to 
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has 
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry 
concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted. 
322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944). 
 41. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977). 
 42. Id. at 275–76. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. 
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Plant Genetic Sys. 
N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Wyeth v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1:07CV91, 2009 WL 3335062, at *9 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 14, 2009) 
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Circuit’s restriction of the patents’ scopes to their disclosures would be to 
narrow the possibilities for blocking patents for improvements to the first and 
second circumstances described above and to eliminate the third circumstance 
where an inventor could make a valid claim to a genus containing species that 
the inventor did not invent. 
This Article begins in Part I by tracing the historical background of 
blocking patents.  Part II sets out the enablement, written description, and 
nonobviousness requirements for patentability.  Part III analyzes the most 
recent example of a blocking patent that has been upheld by the Federal 
Circuit—the epic polypropylene case that was litigated over three decades.  
Part IV discusses the recent line of decisions from the Federal Circuit.  This is 
followed by a brief conclusion. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BLOCKING PATENTS 
The history of blocking patents in the United States appropriately begins 
with the following provision from the Patent Act of 1793: 
[A]ny person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of 
any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have 
been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall 
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first 
inventor be at liberty to use the improvement . . . .45 
The Supreme Court examined this provision in Evans v. Eaton,46 a case 
involving a patent on an improved version of a machine used for 
manufacturing flour called a Hopperboy.  The plaintiff contended that the 
patent was for the whole of the improved Hopperboy, or alternatively, for only 
the improvement in the Hopperboy that the plaintiff developed.47  The Court 
first determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent on the whole of 
the improved Hopperboy because the plaintiff’s invention consisted of only an 
addition to the previous embodiment of the Hopperboy.48  The Court then 
decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent on his improvement of the 
Hopperboy because he had not specified what his improvement was on the 
invention.49  The plaintiff described the whole of the improved Hopperboy, but 
 
(following the line of Federal Circuit decisions); Int’l Automated Sys., Inc. v. Digital Persona, 
Inc. 565 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1305 (D. Utah 2008). 
 45. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 
357, § 20, 5 Stat. 117, 125. 
 46. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
 47. Id. at 357. 
 48. Id. at 430–31.  See also Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) 
(No. 17, 971) (noting that unless the patentee invented a whole new machine, the patent should be 
confined to the improvement). 
 49. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 432–35. 
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the Court ruled that he must describe his own improvement in order to obtain a 
patent on the improvement.50 
Congress repealed the explicit provision for blocking patents in 1836,51 
and has never reenacted it.  Nevertheless, courts continued to recognize the 
principle that an original patent could block the practice of a patent on an 
improvement to the invention in the original patent.52  The earliest published 
decision with such a holding is probably Woodworth v. Rogers.53  Although 
Woodworth was decided in 1847, it relied on the Act of 1793, which had been 
repealed over a decade before, for the proposition that “no one can make an 
improvement on [a patented invention] . . . while the original term, or renewals 
of it, exist, without the license of the original patentee.”54  Star Salt Caster Co. 
v. Crossman55 followed Woodworth and involved an agreement allocating 
royalties between the owner of a patent on an original invention and the owner 
of a patent on an improvement to the original invention.  In enforcing the 
agreement, the court stated: 
  Two patents of the kind may both be valid where the second is an 
improvement upon the first, in which event, if the second includes the first, 
neither can lawfully use that of the other without the other’s consent.  Plainly 
the second patent could not be used without the consent of the owner of the 
first, nor could the owner of the first patent use the second without the consent 
of the owner, as the patent contains an invention which the owner of the first 
patent never made.56 
In Cochrane v. Deemer,57 the Supreme Court held that the defendants 
infringed a patent on a process for making flour, even though the defendants 
made improvements to the patented process that might themselves have been 
patentable.58  The Court concluded that the patented invention was “at the 
bottom of” the defendants’ improvements, and the defendants could not 
appropriate the patent “even though [the patented invention was] supplemented 
by and enveloped in very important and material improvements of their 
own.”59 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 20, 5 Stat. 117, 125. 
 52. See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 
MICH. L. REV. 755, 767–68 (1948). 
 53. 30 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 18,018). 
 54. Id. at 583. 
 55. 22 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878) (No. 13,321). 
 56. Id. at 1135. 
 57. 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 58. Id. at 787. 
 59. Id. 
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The Supreme Court next addressed the relationship between original and 
improvement patents in Cantrell v. Wallick.60  The defendants contended that 
the patent was invalid because the invention was not entirely novel, but instead 
was an improvement on an earlier patented invention.61  Rejecting this 
argument, the Court explained: 
Two patents may both be valid when the second is an improvement on the 
first, in which event, if the second includes the first, neither of the two 
patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other without the other’s 
consent. 
  Therefore, letters patent for an improvement on a patented invention 
cannot be declared void because they include such patented invention.62 
In Herman v. Youngstown Car Manufacturing Co.,63 the trial court relied 
on the fact that the defendant obtained a license for a patent on an 
improvement in concluding that the company did not infringe a patent on an 
original invention.64  In reversing, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
that the trial court’s reasoning was based on a fundamental error: “A patent is 
not the grant of a right to make or use or sell.  It does not, directly or indirectly, 
imply any such right.  It grants only the right to exclude others.”65  The 
appellate court continued by noting that many patents are granted in a field that 
a prior generic or basic patent covers, and that these patents are tributary to the 
prior patent and cannot be practiced without a license from the owner of the 
prior patent.66  The court also explained that even though the issuance of an 
improvement patent indicates that there is a patentable difference between the 
improvement and original invention, the existence of a patentable difference 
does not preclude infringement, because the improvement could still be based 
on the original invention.67 
Besides Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court has dealt with the 
subject of blocking patents in only one other case—Temco Electric Motor Co. 
v. Apco Manufacturing Co.68  In Temco, the plaintiff was the assignee of a 
patent issued to Ralph and William Thompson for shock absorbers on motor 
vehicles.69  The Thompson patent involved combining relatively high 
frequency coiled springs with the relatively low frequency leaf springs that 
 
 60. 117 U.S. 689 (1886). 
 61. Id. at 694. 
 62. Id. (citation omitted). 
 63. 191 F. 579 (6th Cir. 1911). 
 64. Id. at 584. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 584–85. 
 67. Id. at 585. 
 68. 275 U.S. 319 (1928). 
 69. Id. at 322. 
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were originally built into motor vehicles.70  See Figure 1 below.71  Because the 
coiled springs and leaf springs oscillated at different frequencies, their 
oscillations interfered with each other, and together the two springs quickly 
absorbed vibrations from the road.72 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Thompson Patent73 
Initially, the Thompson shock absorbers experienced success, but after 
several years, it became clear that the coiled springs wore out due to friction 
between the springs and the casings in which they moved when an uneven load 
tilted the vehicle body.74  To solve this problem, Thompson added a pivot so 
that the leaf springs and vehicle body could tilt without affecting the vertical 
orientation of the coiled springs.75  See Figure 2 below.76  The Thompsons 
applied for a patent for this improvement to their shock absorbers, but the 
Patent Office determined in an interference proceeding that William Storrie 
had priority on account of a patent application filed five years and five months 
after the issuance of the original Thompson patent.77  The Patent Office 
therefore issued the patent for the improvement to Storrie.78  Storrie licensed 
 
 70. Id.; U.S. Patent No. 1,072,791 (filed Oct. 10, 1912), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/ 
netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter “1,072,791” in search prompt and then follow “Images” 
hyperlink). 
 71. ‘791 Patent. 
 72. Temco, 275 U.S. at 322–23. 
 73. ‘791 Patent. 
 74. Temco, 275 U.S. at 324–25. 
 75. Id. at 324; U.S. Patent No. 1,279,035 (filed March 18, 1918), available at http://patft. 
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (enter “1,279,035” in search prompt and then follow 
“Images” hyperlink). 
 76. ‘035 Patent. 
 77. Temco, 275 U.S. at 321–22, 325. 
 78. Id. at 325. 
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his patent to the defendant, and the defendant raised the license from Storrie as 
a defense in the plaintiff’s action for infringement of the Thompson patent.79  
Citing Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court rejected this defense: “It is 
well established that an improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of 
another, and that the improver without a license is an infringer, and may be 
sued as such.”80 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Storrie Patent81 
A comparison of the Thompson patent in Figure 1 with the Storrie patent 
in Figure 2 shows that they fit within the category of blocking patents where 
the improvement is a combination of a component with the earlier invention.  
In this case, Storrie combined the pivot on the rod inside the coiled springs to 
the shock absorbers in the Thompson patent.  Furthermore, having the 
Thompson patent dominate the Storrie patent seems appropriate from an 
economic standpoint because the Thompsons’ contribution to automotive 
technology was surely more significant than Storrie’s contribution.  Of course, 
before the addition of the pivot, the Thompson shock absorbers wore out after 
several years, but the Thompsons made the fundamental advance, while 
Storrie’s improvement was less significant.82  It is less clear what payoffs the 
Thompsons and Storrie would have needed in order to recover the costs they 
incurred in making their respective discoveries, but since the Thompsons also 
applied for a patent on the Storrie improvement, it appears that the Thompsons 
incurred the improvement costs as well.83  Accordingly, it seems appropriate 
that the Thompsons should have been allocated the greater share of the profits 
from the invention of the shock absorbers. 
 
 79. See id. at 325, 328. 
 80. Id. at 328. 
 81. ‘035 Patent. 
 82. Temco, 275 U.S. at 324–25. 
 83. Id. 
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After Temco, federal courts followed the principle that a patent on an 
original patent could block the practice of a patent on an improvement.  For 
example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the possibility of 
blocking patents in New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster:84 “The prior patentee 
cannot use the improvement without the consent of the improver, and the latter 
cannot use the original invention without the consent of the former.”85  In Wine 
Railway Appliance Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,86 the Fourth Circuit dealt with 
a patent on an improvement consisting of an additional element combined with 
a prior patented invention.87  The court ruled that “it is perfectly well settled 
that a device which embodies the principles of a basic patent as well as one for 
an improvement infringes both.”88  The Fifth Circuit declared in Zachos v. 
Sherwin-Williams Co.89 that “an improver must respect the rights of the patent 
on which he improves,”90 and affirmed a judgment finding that the owner of a 
patent on a modification that may have been a slight improvement over the 
original invention infringed the patent on the original invention.91 
The Federal Circuit has also recognized the possibility of blocking patents 
on improvements.92  In Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc.,93 the court 
commented, “We, of course, agree . . . that one may not be able to practice the 
invention protected by a patent directed to an improvement of another’s 
patented article or method except with a license under the latter.”94  The court 
expressed the same principle in mathematical terms in Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. 
du Pont De Nemours & Co.,95 stating, “Du Pont concedes that, if Atlas patents 
A + B + C and Du Pont then patents the improvement A + B + C + D, Du Pont 
is liable to Atlas for any manufacture, use, or sale of A + B + C + D because 
the latter directly infringes claims to A + B + C.”96  The court in Texas 
Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission97 similarly 
remarked, “Devices that have been modified to such an extent that the 
 
 84. 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 85. Id. at 279. 
 86. 78 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1935). 
 87. Id. at 313–14. 
 88. Id. at 315–16. 
 89. 164 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1947). 
 90. Id. at 235. 
 91. Id. at 234–35. 
 92. See, e.g., Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 594. 
 95. 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 96. Id. at 1580.  The Federal Circuit upheld the trial court’s findings that there was no literal 
infringement but that there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  Id. 
 97. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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modification may be separately patented may nonetheless infringe the claims 
of the basic patent.”98 
While recognizing blocking cases on improvements, these cases did not 
address either the enablement requirement for the original patents or the 
nonobviousness requirement for the improvement patents.99  The enablement 
and written description requirements may place significant limitations on the 
scope of claims in an original patent, and the nonobviousness requirement may 
limit the validity of an improvement patent.  Consequently, these requirements 
may affect whether an improvement patent infringes an original patent.  The 
following section discusses the enablement, written description, and 
nonobviousness requirements for blocking patents. 
II.  THE ENABLEMENT, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, AND NONOBVIOUSNESS 
REQUIREMENTS 
The requirement that a patent specification must include a description 
sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention has 
been a part of the patent law since the first patent statute of 1790.100  In 1847, 
the Supreme Court ruled that, as a result of this requirement, a patent for a new 
composition of matter would be void if the specification only identified the 
substances that were to be combined without stating their relative proportions, 
or if it stated the proportions ambiguously.101  Otherwise, “no one could use 
the invention without first ascertaining by experiment the exact proportion of 
the different ingredients required to produce the result intended to be 
obtained.”102 
Several years later, the Supreme Court applied the enablement requirement 
to limit the permissible scope of patent claims in O’Reilly v. Morse,103 which 
involved Samuel Morse’s patent for the telegraph.104  The Supreme Court 
upheld the patent’s first seven claims, which referenced the description of the 
 
 98. Id. at 1563.  For additional cases recognizing blocking patents on improvements, see 5 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 [1][a] (2009). 
 99. Atlas Powder did discuss enablement of the claims in the original patent and decided that 
the enablement requirement was satisfied for them.  Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  The improvement, however, did not 
literally infringe those claims.  Id. at 1579.  Instead, the court found infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents, and it ruled that the enablement requirement was not applicable to 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  Id. at 1580–81.  Consequently, the court did not 
address whether the defendant’s improvement was enabled by the specification in the original 
patent.  Id. 
 100. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (repealed 1793). 
 101. Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 5 (1847). 
 102. Id. 
 103. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 63 (1853). 
 104. Id. at 64. 
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invention in the specification, and it affirmed the lower court’s injunction for 
infringement of them.105  The Court also decided, however, that the eighth 
claim was void for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement.106  In this last 
claim, the patent sought to cover not only the particular invention described in 
the specification, i.e. the telegraph, but also all improvements on it.107  The 
claim read: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of 
machinery described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of 
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic 
current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for making or 
printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new 
application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or 
discoverer.108 
This claim would have covered future technologies, such as radio and 
television, which Morse had not invented.  The Court held that the patentee 
claimed “what he has not described in the manner required by law,” and that “a 
patent for such a claim is as strongly forbidden by the act of Congress, as if 
some other person had invented it before him.”109 
The enablement requirement also limited the permissible scope of claims 
in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,110 which involved 
a patent for incandescent lights issued to William E. Sawyer and Albon 
Man.111  The specification described the invention as using an incandescent 
conductor consisting “of carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material” 
inside a transparent sealed vessel from which oxygen was excluded.112  The 
patent had four claims, two of which are relevant here.113  The first claim was 
for “[a]n incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized fibrous or 
textile material, and of an arch or horseshoe shape, substantially as 
hereinbefore set forth.”114  The third claim was for “[t]he incandescing 
conductor for an electric lamp, formed of carbonized paper, substantially as 
described.”115  The specification also said that in the practice of the invention, 
 
 105. Id. at 112. 
 106. Id. at 113, 117. 
 107. Id. at 112. 
 108. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112. 
 109. Id. at 120. 
 110. 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
 111. Id. at 465–66. 
 112. Id. at 466. 
 113. Id. at 468. 
 114. Id. at 468. 
 115. Electric Light, 159 U.S. at 468. 
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the inventors had used carbonized paper and wood carbon of varying shapes 
and contours.116 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed the first claim by using an 
incandescent light bulb supplied by the Edison Electric Company that had an 
incandescent conductor made of bamboo.117  The Supreme Court decided that 
the first claim violated the enablement requirement because it was 
overbroad.118  It reasoned that the permissible scope of a claim depended on 
how generic the relevant characteristic was over the range of the claim.119  The 
Court explained: 
If, for instance, minerals or porcelains had always been used for a particular 
purpose, and a person should take out a patent for a similar article of wood, 
and woods generally were adapted to that purpose, the claim might not be too 
broad, though defendant used wood of a different kind from that of the 
patentee.  But if woods generally were not adapted to the purpose, and yet the 
patentee had discovered a wood possessing certain qualities, which gave it a 
peculiar fitness for such purpose, it would not constitute an infringement for 
another to discover and use a different kind of wood, which was found to 
contain similar or superior qualities.120 
The Court pointed out that Thomas Edison discovered that a particular species 
of bamboo optimally served as an incandescent conductor in a light bulb only 
after testing many types of plants over a period of several months.121  It 
concluded that the specification did not enable persons skilled in the art to 
practice the invention over the range of the first claim without a substantial 
amount of experimentation, because the specification did not disclose which 
fibrous or textile materials were suitable for use as an incandescent 
conductor.122 
The issue of the permissible scope of claims often arises with respect to 
patents on chemical compositions where an inventor discovered one or more 
particular compositions (i.e. species) and seeks to obtain a broader patent on a 
category (i.e. a genus) of chemical compositions.  For example, in Corona 
Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.,123 the patented invention was a 
process for vulcanizing rubber more rapidly using a particular chemical, 
diphenylguanidine.124  The patent included claims involving not only 
diphenylguanidine, but also the class of chemicals called disubstituted 
 
 116. Id. at 467. 
 117. See id. at 468. 
 118. See id. at 472. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Electric Light, 159 U.S. at 472. 
 121. Id. at 472–73. 
 122. See id. at 475–76. 
 123. 276 U.S. 358 (1928). 
 124. Id. at 365. 
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guanidines, which included not only diphenylguanidine but also between fifty 
and one-hundred other chemicals.125  Following Consolidated Electric Light, 
the Supreme Court held that the claims for the class of disubstituted guanidines 
was invalid, because the patentee made no showing that there was “any general 
quality common to disubstituted guanidines which made them all effective” for 
use in the process of the invention.126  The Court pointed out that a number of 
the chemicals in the class that was claimed were not effective.127  In addition, 
other members of the class had been discovered and used to accelerate the 
process of vulcanizing rubber before the filing of the patent application.128 
Corona Cord Tire suggests that a patentee must show that every species in 
a class must have the characteristics needed for use in the invention in order 
for the patentee to claim the genus.  But courts have not required such a 
showing as long as the specification is sufficient to enable a person of ordinary 
skill in the art to make and use the invention over the range of the claim 
without “undue experimentation.”129  In re Ellis provides an example.130  The 
invention, a type of paint remover, contained solvents belonging to a class of 
chemicals called ketonic derivatives of cyclic CH2 hydrocarbons.131  The 
Patent Office sought to limit the claims to a particular solvent within the 
class,132 but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia allowed the 
patent to extend to the entire class.133  The court held that the specification with 
its enumeration of numerous chemicals in the class was “sufficient to convey 
to one skilled in the art the nature of the chemicals which will accomplish the 
desired result.”134  It distinguished Consolidated Electric Light by explaining 
that the chemicals in the designated class had the common quality of being 
solvents and were suitable for use in the invention.135 
Similarly, in In re Angstadt,136 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
upheld a claim for a process that involved using catalysts selected from a class 
of chemicals.137  The specification disclosed forty examples of species that 
were tested out of thousands of species of chemicals within the genus, and the 
 
 125. See id. at 385. 
 126. Id. at 385. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Corona Cord Tire, 276 U.S. at 382–83, 385. 
 129. See, e.g., In re Gray, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 130. 37 App. D.C. 203 (1911).  For additional discussion of Ellis, see C. H. Biesterfeld, 
Breadth and Scope of Chemical Claims, 2 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 598, 602–05 (1919). 
 131. Ellis, 37 App. D.C. at 204–05. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 207. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 208–09. 
 136. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
 137. Id. at 499, 501. 
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specification also stated that some of the species would not work in the 
process.138  The court explained that the process in the invention was not 
complicated, and therefore, a person skilled in the particular art could take the 
specification with its forty examples and readily determine which of the 
species within the scope of the claims would work and which would not.139  
The court held that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the 
invention over the range of the claims without undue experimentation, and that 
the key word was “undue,” rather than “experimentation.”140 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided in Amgen, 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.141 that a claim for the genus of all the 
DNA sequences for proteins that were sufficiently duplicative of a particular 
protein with 165 amino acids was invalid for lack of enablement.142  The court 
noted that the patentee had made only fifty to eighty examples of the millions 
of possible DNA sequences that could be within the genus, and after five years 
of experimentation, the plaintiff was not able to determine which of the 
millions of possible DNA sequences actually were within the claim.143  The 
court distinguished Angstadt on the grounds that the patentee had not provided 
“a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the 
invention commensurate with the scope of his claims,” which in the context of 
DNA sequences meant “disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to 
justify grant of the claims sought.”144 
As the court explained in Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,145 enablement 
requires more than “[t]ossing out the mere germ of an idea” or “vague 
intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.”146  The 
specification does not have to include a working example147 or disclose what 
would already be known to those skilled in the art,148 but it does need to 
provide enough information to enable persons skilled in the art to carry out the 
 
 138. Id. at 205. 
 139. Id. at 503. 
 140. Id. at 503–04. 
 141. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 142. Id. at 1203, 1212–13. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1213.  See also In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting a 
single example in specification for producing one mammalian protein in one plant species did not 
provide sufficient information to enable broad claims for producing any type of mammalian 
protein in any plant species); In re Vacek, 947 F.2d 488, 495–96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the 
disclosure of nine genera of cyanobacteria in specification with working example for only one 
species did not enable claim for all 150 genera of cyanobacteria). 
 145. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 146. Id. at 1366. 
 147. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 148. Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366. 
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invention without undue experimentation.149  The Federal Circuit has noted 
that whether a specification requires undue experimentation to practice an 
invention depends on the following factors: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or 
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the 
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of 
those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims.150 
In addition to requiring a patent specification to enable a person of skill in 
the art to make and use the invention as claimed, the Federal Circuit also 
requires the specification to include a written description of the invention.151  
One major purpose of the written description requirement is to establish that 
the patent applicant had possession of what the applicant claimed as the 
invention on the date of filing the application.152  Another purpose is to prevent 
an applicant from amending claims and have the claims relate back to an 
earlier filing date in order to gain priority of invention over a competing 
applicant.153 
There is a large amount of overlap between the written description and 
enablement requirements, because a written description of the invention will 
often enable a person of skill in the art to make and use the invention.  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has noted the following distinctions between 
the two requirements: 
[A]n invention may be described without an enabling disclosure of how to 
make and use it.  A description of a chemical compound without a description 
of how to make and use it, unless within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the 
art, is an example.  Moreover, an invention may be enabled even though it has 
 
 149. Id. at 1365. 
 150. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 151. For a summary of the historical background of the written description requirement, see 
In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591–93 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 152. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. 
Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Enzo-Bichem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 
956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
see also In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967).  But see Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161–63 (2006) (arguing that possession of the 
invention should be established through proof of enablement rather than the written description 
requirement). 
 153. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The written 
description requirement prevents applicants from using the amendment process to update their 
disclosures (claims or specifications) during their pendency before the patent office.”); see also 
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Robert P. Merges, 
Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1651–56 
(2007) (urging that the written description requirement should be limited to “misappropriation by 
amendment” cases such as Gentry Gallery). 
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not been described.  Such can occur when enablement of a closely related 
invention A that is both described and enabled would similarly enable an 
invention B if B were described.  A specification can likewise describe an 
invention without enabling the practice of the full breadth of its claims.154 
Because the enablement requirement relies on what would be apparent to 
persons skilled in the art, it closely parallels the modern standard for 
nonobviousness.  As provided in 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is not 
patentable “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented 
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which said subject matter pertains.”155 
Before § 103 was adopted in 1952, however, the standard for patentability 
revolved around the concept of invention, which was described as “inherently 
elusive,”156 and it appeared to evolve over time.157  In an early case, Hotchkiss 
v. Greenwood,158 the Supreme Court ruled that a patent for an improved 
doorknob made of clay, rather than wood or metal, was invalid because it 
involved merely the substitution of a known material for others.159  It held: 
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by 
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of 
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every 
invention.  In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful 
mechanic, not that of the inventor.160 
The emphasis in Hotchkiss on “invention” as a requirement for patentability 
caused confusion in the courts and created uncertainty in the applicability of 
this standard for patentability.161 
 
 154. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921–22 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted). 
 155. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 156. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151 (1950); see 
also Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 
Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 859–62 (1964) (noting vagueness of the “requirement for 
invention” that evolved out of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood). 
 157. Edmond W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. 
CT. REV. 293, 303 (1966). 
 158. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). 
 159. Id. at 262. 
 160. Id. at 267. 
 161. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (“The truth is the word [invention] 
cannot be defined in such a manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a 
particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. 
v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 1964) (“It is virtually a practical 
impossibility to define adequately that abstraction which we call invention.”); Trabon Eng’g 
Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943) (“Long experience with assailed inventions in 
trial and on review led us in humility to the conclusion that the inventive concept is an abstraction 
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By tying it directly to the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in 
the art, § 103 clarified the standard for patentability.  As a consequence, the 
scope of enablement for the patent for an original invention (i.e. that which is 
within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the art) closely tracks the scope of 
patentability for an improvement to the original invention under the 
nonobvious requirement (i.e., whether the differences between the 
improvement and the original invention would have been obvious to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art).  Since a person having ordinary skill in the art 
is presumed to have known of the specification for the original invention,162 
there would seem to be little room for a patent on an improvement to be both 
within the scope of enablement for the patent on the original invention and 
nonobvious. 
One possibility might be that the scope of patentability for an improvement 
could extend beyond what is nonobvious on account of the doctrine of 
equivalents.  The doctrine of equivalents arose to prevent a fraud on a patent 
by a copyist making insubstantial changes to a patented invention to take it 
outside of the literal scope of its claims.163  A device is typically infringing 
under the doctrine of equivalents “if it performs substantially the same function 
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result”164 as a patented 
invention, even though the device and patented invention may “differ in name, 
form, or shape.”165  The Supreme Court has noted, “An important factor [in 
determining equivalency] is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art 
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in 
the patent with one that was.”166 
Even with the doctrine of equivalents, though, the scope of patent 
protection for an original invention generally should not extend to cover 
nonobvious improvements.  The purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to 
cover insignificant modifications of the original invention that do not 
 
impossible to define . . . .”); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 639 (2d  Cir. 1942) 
(“‘Invention,’ for patent purposes, has been difficult to define.  Efforts to cage the concept in 
words have proved almost as unsuccessful as attempts verbally to imprison the concept 
‘beautiful.’”); Warren Telechron Co. v. Waltham Watch Co., 91 F.2d 472, 473 (1st Cir. 1937) 
(“The quality which constitutes invention is indefinable, as has often been said. . . . It is a matter 
of feeling rather than of logic.”). 
 162. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary 
skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”); 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is the 
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art who is referred to in § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act 
who must be presumed to have, or is charged with having, knowledge of all material prior art.”). 
 163. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 164. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). 
 165. Id. at 608 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)). 
 166. Id. at 609 (quoted in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25 
(1997)). 
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substantially affect its function or the way the invention, as modified, 
accomplishes its results.167  Generally, an improvement based upon such 
changes would be obvious to persons of skill in the art and would therefore not 
qualify for a patent.  For example, in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. 
Linde Air Products Co., the Court found that the defendant’s substitution of 
manganese for magnesium in the patented welding flux was infringing under 
the doctrine of equivalents.168  The Court emphasized that persons familiar 
with welding fluxes were aware, and the chemical literature confirmed, that 
manganese could be substituted for magnesium in welding fluxes.169  It is 
therefore inconceivable that the defendant in Graver Tank could have obtained 
a patent for a welding flux with manganese that would have satisfied the 
nonobviousness requirement. 
The doctrine of equivalents, however, may extend the scope of patent 
protection to cover not only unclaimed variations of an original invention that 
were well known at the time the patent was filed, such as the welding flux in 
Graver Tank, but also after-arising technologies.170  Although after-arising 
technologies may not be within the present grasp of persons of ordinary skill in 
the art, persons of ordinary skill in the art may have the capability of adapting 
present inventions to after-arising technologies when they eventually come on-
line. 
For example, the Federal Circuit upheld claims to reach after-arising 
technology in Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.171  The claims in 
issue were for interactive television program guides that allowed viewers to 
search through a large volume of broadcasted television information without 
having to wait for the information to scroll down to them on their television 
screens.172  The claims involved mixing a “regularly received television signal” 
with search instructions from television viewers through a remote control 
 
 167. Id. at 607–09. 
 168. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 169. Id. at 612. 
 170. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (designating after-arising technologies as a “quintessential example of an enforceable 
equivalent”). 
 171. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  For additional decisions stating that claims may cover 
after-arising technology, see Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.3d 1363, 1371–72 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our case law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the 
literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough.”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The 
claims can therefore be construed to cover later developed technology that was unavailable but 
known at the time of the invention.”).  See also Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 
491 F.2d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that a patent for using a narrow collimated beam of 
light to lay sewer pipe was infringed by a device that used a laser even though lasers did not exist 
when the patent application was filed). 
 172. Superguide, 358 F.3d at 873. 
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system and a microprocessor.173  The claims did not specify whether the 
television signals were in analog or digital format, but the trial court ruled that 
the claims were limited to analog television signals, because analog television 
signals were the only type of television signals that were broadcast at the time 
the patent was filed.174  The Federal Circuit reversed, giving the claims a broad 
construction that included both analog and digital signals, combinations of 
them, and even signals in other formats.175  The Federal Circuit observed that 
although analog was the dominant format for television signals at the time of 
filing, persons of skill in the art were aware then that video data could be 
communicated in either analog or digital format.176  While the Superguide 
decision was concerned with claim interpretation and did not expressly address 
enablement, it would seem that the enablement requirement would also have 
been satisfied, since the specification would have enabled persons of ordinary 
skill in the art to adapt the invention to a digital format. 
Similarly, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,177 the Federal Circuit 
ruled that a patent for an apparatus controlling the velocity and orientation of a 
satellite was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.178  The claims stated 
that the apparatus included means for sending data of the satellite’s location 
and orientation to an external source and means for receiving control signals 
from the external source to alter the satellite’s velocity and orientation.179  At 
the time of filing of the patent application, computers were too large to be 
placed on satellites.180  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that a satellite 
using a later developed on-board computer for controlling the satellite’s 
velocity and orientation was infringing because it performed “the same 
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the 
apparatus described in the patent.181  The Federal Circuit noted that once on-
board computers became available, any intelligent engineer could adapt the 
apparatus described in the patent to using them for controlling the satellite.182  
The improvement of using an on-board computer in the original patent would 
not have been patentable, because the improvement would have been obvious 
 
 173. Id. at 875. 
 174. Id. at 876–77. 
 175. Id. at 878. 
 176. Id. at 879.  The specification also did not differentiate between analog and digital 
signals, but instead referred to regular received television signals as “video data.”  Id. 
 177. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 178. Id. at 1366. 
 179. Id. at 1355. 
 180. See id. at 1364–65 (noting on-board computers required time to be developed). 
 181. Id. at 1365.  See also Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 326 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“[A]n embellishment’ made possible by technological advances may not permit an 
accused device to escape ‘the web of infringement.”). 
 182. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364–65. 
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to a person of ordinary skill in the art once on-board computers became 
available.  Therefore, there could not be blocking patents between the original 
invention and the improvement. 
Even though the doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of infringement 
beyond the scope of a patent’s claims, it will not provide an opportunity for 
blocking patents to arise because improvements within the range of the 
doctrine of equivalents will not be patentable.  The range of the doctrine of 
equivalents is limited to variations that must perform the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result.  These variations would 
be obvious to persons of ordinary skill in the art, however, with respect to 
after-arising technology.183 
Another possible way in which the claims of a patent might be able to 
extend to nonobvious after-arising technology involves the timing of 
enablement.184  A line of cases have ruled that the enablement requirement was 
satisfied with respect to species that were within the scope of a claim to a 
genus and were unknown at the time of the filing of a patent application so 
long as the specification enabled all the species in the genus that were known 
at the time of filing.185  These cases produced the paradigm example of 
blocking patents in recent times.  They arose out of the invention of crystalline 
polypropylene in the early 1950s and the epic litigation that came in its wake.  
The next section examines the polypropylene litigation and the paradoxical 
 
 183. In Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., the Federal Circuit held: “It is 
not a requirement of equivalence, however, that those skilled in the art know of the equivalence 
when the patent application is filed or the patent issues.  That question is determined as of the 
time infringement takes place.” 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  The court did not suggest, 
however, that an improvement within the range of the doctrine of equivalents would satisfy the 
nonobviousness requirement for patentability at the time that the improvement was first 
developed.  Rather, its ruling only addressed whether the improvement would have been known 
to those skilled in the art at the times that the patent was filed and issued.  Id. 
 184. See Hugh McTavish, Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 121, 139 n.118 (2001) (“Blocking patents arise because of [the] point in time at which 
enablement is judged.”). 
 185. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (“[C]ertainly, the disclosure of specifics adds to the understanding one skilled in the art 
would glean from a generic term, but it does not follow that such added disclosure limits the 
meaning thereof.”) (citation omitted); Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356, 362 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (“Generally, in determining entitlement to a patent when there are contending 
inventors, priority is awarded to the party who first reduced to practice a conception of the 
invention if all other conditions of patentability are satisfied.”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting patents of a subsequent improvement should not be “utilize[d] . . . to 
‘reach back’ and preclude or invalidate a patent on the underlying invention”); Phillips Petroleum 
Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1357 (D. Del. 1987) (“It is the burden of an alleged 
infringer not merely to demonstrate that it is better but to demonstrate that it is in fact a different 
product.  Defendants have wholly failed to do this.”); Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 494 F. 
Supp. 370, 374–76 (D. Del. 1980). 
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produced during the oil refining process.195  Although it has some use as a fuel 
gas and also for producing other chemicals, propylene’s primary use today is in 
producing polypropylene.196  Propylene is composed entirely of carbon (C) and 
hydrogen (H) atoms, and its chemical formula is C3H6.197  The chemical 
structure for propylene is represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Propylene Structure 
The double line between the carbon atoms (labeled 1 and 2) represents a 
double bond, while the single lines between the other parts of the structure 
represent single bonds.  The unit labeled CH3 is called a methyl group (CH4 is 
methane), and like the hydrogen atoms, the methyl group has a single bond 
with a carbon atom.  Double bonds are more reactive than single bonds, and so 
chemical reactions are more likely to occur in molecules with double bonds.198  
Polymerization of propylene to form polypropylene is accomplished by 
replacing the double bond between the carbon atoms with a single bond 
between them and a released bond which may then attach to other molecular 
units to form a polymer chain as shown below.199  Usually, a catalyst is used to 
induce the chemical reactions for the formation of polymers.200 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Atactic Polypropylene 
It should be noted that every two carbon atoms in the chain have three 
hydrogen atoms and one methyl group attached to them so that together they 
form C3H6.  In addition, some of the methyl groups lie above the central 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. ICIS.com, Propylene CAS No: 115-07-1, http://www.icis.com/v2/chemicals/9076453/ 
propylene.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 197. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1284–85 (D. 
Del. 1987). 
 198. Id. at 1285. 
 199. CLIVE MAIER & TERESA CALAFUT, POLYPROPYLENE: THE DEFINITIVE USER’S GUIDE 
AND DATABOOK 3 (1998). 
 200. Id. 
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carbon chain, while some of them are below the chain.  Molecules of 
polypropylene in which the methyl groups are randomly arranged above and 
below the carbon chain are called atactic polypropylene.201  Prior to the early 
1950s, the only form of polypropylene that had been produced was amorphous 
polypropylene, which is formed from atactic molecules of polypropylene.202  
Amorphous polypropylene is a liquid at room temperature,203 and therefore 
does not exhibit the useful qualities of polypropylene as we know it today. 
In isotatic polypropylene all the methyl groups are arranged on the same 
side of the central carbon atom chain, as shown below.204  Formation of 
isotactic polypropylene is achieved through the use of particular catalysts that 
control the orientation of the propylene molecules as they are lined up in the 
polymer chain.205 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Isotactic Polypropylene 
With all the methyl groups on the same side of the central carbon chain, the 
molecules coil up into helixes and then the molecules are able to form crystals 
as shown in the microphotograph of crystalline polypropylene below.206  When 
the crystals form, the polypropylene molecules pack together into a tight, 
regular array called a crystal lattice.207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201. The terms “atactic” and “isotactic” originated with Giulio Natta’s wife, Rosita Natta, 
who happened to be a language scholar and semanticist.  Karl Ziegler, Consequences and 
Development of an Invention, in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY 1963–1970 12 (1972); FRANK 
M. MCMILLAN, THE CHAIN STRAIGHTENERS: FRUITFUL INNOVATION:  THE DISCOVERY OF 
LINEAR AND STEREOREGULAR SYNTHETIC POLYMERS 127 (1979). 
 202. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1316.  The amorphous polypropylene was also tree-branched, 
rather than arranged in a linear chain.  Id. 
 203. Standard Oil v. Montedison S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 416 (D. Del. 1980) (“In the 
polymerization of propylene over commonly used catalysts, such as phosphoric acid and nickel 
on silica-alumina, the polymer produced is liquid and contains little, if any, solid polymer.”). 
 204. MAIER & CALAFUT, supra note 199, at 4. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Phillips, 673 F. Supp. at 1286. 
 207. Id. 
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Figure 6.  Microphotograph of Polypropylene 
The formation of the crystal lattice has a “very profound effect upon the 
physical properties” of the polypropylene.208  The ordered arrangement of the 
crystal lattice causes the polypropylene to become a solid up to its melting 
point of 320º F and imparts strength to the material.209  The attractive forces in 
the crystal lattice also make the polypropylene impervious to solvents and 
acids that would otherwise cause it to dissolve.210 
The synthesis of crystalline polypropylene was a major scientific 
achievement.  The discovery is described in the Encyclopedia Britannica as 
follows: 
It is generally accepted that isotactic polypropylene was discovered in 1954 by 
the Italian chemist Giulio Natta and his assistant Paolo Chini, working in 
association with Montecatini (now Montedison SpA) and employing catalysts 
of the type recently invented by Karl Ziegler for synthesizing polyethylene. 
(Partly in recognition of this achievement, Natta was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for Chemistry in 1963 along with Ziegler.)211 
B. The Natta Patent 
Karl Ziegler was a prominent German professor who was the director of 
the Max Planck Institute for Coal Research in Mülheim, Germany.212  After 
two decades of research on organic compounds of metals, Professor Ziegler 
discovered during World War II an Aufbau (“growth”) reaction in which a 
particular metal-organic compound induced the growth of linear chains of 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1286–87 (internal citations omitted). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Industrial Polymers, Major, in 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 315 (15th ed. 2007). 
 212. Biography Karl Ziegler, in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY, supra note 201, at 25. 
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ethylene molecules.213  This research eventually led to his synthesis of 
polyethylene, another major plastic, in 1953. 214 
Giulio Natta was professor and director of the Department of Industrial 
Chemistry at the Milan Polytechnic, and his area of research was hydrocarbon 
chemistry.215  After hearing a lecture by Professor Ziegler in 1952, Professor 
Natta realized that the catalysts that Ziegler had discovered could be used to 
produce linear chains from other organic compounds.216  Natta arranged with 
the Montecatini Chemical Company, Italy’s largest chemical company, to 
invite Ziegler to a meeting in Milan to discuss his research.217  That meeting 
led to an agreement in which Montecatini purchased rights for the commercial 
development of Ziegler’s research in Italy and Natta was given access to 
Ziegler’s research.218  The research and licensing agreement between Ziegler 
and Montecatini also provided for three of Natta’s research assistants 
(nicknamed the “Three Bright Boys”) to visit Ziegler’s laboratory in Mülheim, 
Germany beginning in February of 1953.219  Natta’s research assistants 
followed the synthesis of polyethylene in Professor Ziegler’s laboratory in 
1953.220 
Paolo Chini was one of these research assistants.221  After returning to 
Milan, he repeated certain experiments that Ziegler described in his German 
patent, and was struck by the ease with which he was able to polymerize 
ethylene using a particular mixture of catalysts (which are now known as the 
Ziegler-Natta catalysts).222  On March 11, 1954, Natta instructed Chini to use 
the same catalysts with propylene, whereupon Chini reported that he had 
produced solid polypropylene.223  Further experiments were conducted in the 
spring of 1954, and Natta forwarded them to the Patent Department at 
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Montecatini.224  On June 8, 1954, Montecatini filed a patent application 
claiming the polymerization of propylene with the Italian Patent Office that 
named Natta as the sole inventor.225  On December 10, 1954, Natta submitted a 
paper describing his discovery of crystalline polypropylene to the Journal of 
the American Chemical Society, and the paper was published on March 20, 
1955.226 
C. The Hogan and Banks Patent 
Although Ziegler and Natta were the first to synthesize polypropylene, and 
shared the 1963 Nobel Prize for doing so, the Phillips Petroleum Company was 
awarded a blocking patent in the United States that was given priority over 
Montecatini’s patent.227  In 1951, J. Paul Hogan and Robert L. Banks were 
chemists working in the research laboratory at Phillips Petroleum on 
converting petroleum gases into gasoline.228  One of their experiments 
involved passing propylene through a one-inch tube packed with a catalyst to 
which a chromium salt had been added.229  The experiment failed because their 
tube became clogged with a waxy substance.230  A similar effect had been 
observed by chemists at Shell Development Corporation, who were trying to 
develop synthetic rubber during World War II; but the Shell chemists thought 
the substance they observed was a nuisance, and they abandoned their 
experiment.231  In contrast, Hogan and Banks were able to persuade Phillips’s 
management to allow them to investigate the mysterious substance.232  Hogan 
and Banks conducted a series of experiments in their laboratory using a 
catalyst composed of a support of silica and alumina impregnated with 
chromium oxide that eventually became known as the Marlex catalyst.233  “On 
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March 14, 1952, [they] submitted a Disclosure of Invention [form] to the 
Phillips Patent Department . . . [describing their invention as] a ‘process for the 
production of propylene polymers’, ‘improved polymer products from 
propylene, 1-butene and other monoalkylethylenes’ and a ‘new catalyst for 
polymerization.’”234 The Patent Department requested additional information, 
and on November 26, 1952, Hogan provided the characteristics for the solid 
polypropylene that he had produced: 
melting point °F:  240–280 
density:  0.90–0.95 
intrinsic viscosity: 0.2–1.0 
weight average  
molecular weight:  5,000–20,000.235 
The Hogan and Banks patent application, entitled “Solid Polymers of 
Olefins,”236 was filed on January 27, 1953.237  The application contained the 
information that Hogan provided concerning melting point and average 
molecular weight.238  Unlike Natta’s patent application, the Hogan and Banks 
application failed to identify the polypropylene as crystalline, and it did not 
describe the mechanism for the formation of isotactic polypropylene in terms 
of aligning the methyl groups on the same side of the central carbon chain.239 
The Assistant Director of Research at Phillips, Dr. William Reynolds, 
became aware of Natta’s article in the Journal of the American Chemical 
Society shortly after its publication.240  Although the article did not identify the 
catalysts that Natta used, Reynolds was able to speculate what they were—and 
he suggested that Phillips should investigate the Ziegler-Natta process.241  
Chemists at Phillips conducted experiments with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts in 
the spring of 1955, and succeeded in producing crystalline polypropylene in 
May and June.242  While these experiments were conducted, Reynolds 
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observed: “The more I see of the so called Ziegler polymerization the more I 
am of the opinion that this process represents one of the most basic catalytic 
process discoveries in many years. The process is undoubtedly far more 
general and versatile than demonstrated for MARLEX.”243  Meanwhile, in the 
summer and fall of 1955, other chemists at Phillips were studying the 
polypropylene produced with the Marlex catalyst that Hogan and Banks had 
used.244  They determined that it was an isotactic polymer, but that it was 
brittle, because its highest molecular weight was around 30,000, and molecular 
weights above 50,000 were required for the polypropylene to be flexible.245 
The Phillips chemists advised the Patent Department of their conclusions 
and also that others, including Natta, were claiming that they had invented 
crystalline polypropylene.246  Phillips then decided to file a new application247 
in order to provoke an interference248 so that the United States Patent Office 
would determine which company had priority for the invention.249  While 
Phillips thought that its 1953 application described crystalline polypropylene, 
it was concerned that the word “crystalline” did not appear anywhere in the 
application.250  Therefore, on January 11, 1956, Phillips filed its continuation-
in-part application251 in which it included the claim: “Normally solid 
polypropylene consisting essentially of recurring propylene units, having a 
substantial crystalline polypropylene content.”252  The 1956 application 
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differed significantly from the 1953 application.  In addition to adding 
references to crystalline polymers and crystalline polypropylenes, Phillips 
broadened the ranges of melting points from 240–300°F to 240–320°F, and the 
range of weight average molecular weights from 5000–20,000 to 900–50,000 
and higher.253  In addition, Phillips added four descriptive examples of the 
invention to the application; the last example called for the use of the Ziegler-
Natta catalysts—triethyl aluminum and titanium tetrachloride. 254 
On September 9, 1958, the United States Patent Office instituted and 
declared an interference to authorize the Board of Patent Interferences to 
determine which of five competing companies was entitled to priority of 
invention for crystalline polypropylene.255  Three decades of massive litigation 
then ensued.  The 1960s were spent “in an incredibly involved program of 
discovery.”256  Finally, on November 29, 1971, after hearing testimony from 
126 witnesses, the Board issued a 113-page decision257 awarding priority to 
Montedison for Natta’s patent.258  The litigation continued with the three 
losing parties filing civil actions to challenge the Board’s decision.259  If 
anything, the litigation seemed to become more acrimonious as the plaintiffs 
were permitted to amend their complaints to add charges, which had not been 
raised in the interference, that Montedison had committed fraud by deliberately 
misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts in the filing and 
prosecution of its patent applications.260 
After an eighty-five day trial, the district court issued a ninety-one-page 
decision awarding priority to Phillips for the invention of crystalline 
 
 253. Id. at 1340. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 540 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1976).  The five 
companies were Phillips Petroleum Company, Montedison, S.p.A. (the successor to Montecatini 
Chemical Company), E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, Standard Oil Company and 
Hercules, Inc.  Id. at 614 n.4.  The Board rendered judgment on the issue of priority against 
Hercules, Inc. on October 6, 1964.  Id. 
 256. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 398 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Del. 1975), vacated, 
540 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976).  See generally Montecatini Edison S.p.A. v. E. I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 434 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1970); Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969); In re 
Natta, 410 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1969); Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968); Natta v. Hogan, 
392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968); Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 
615 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Hogan, 309 F. Supp. 945 (D. Del. 1970); In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319 (D. 
Del. 1969); Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1967); In re Natta, 264 F. Supp. 734 (D. 
Del. 1967); In re Natta, 259 F. Supp. 922 (D. Del. 1966). 
 257. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D. Del. 1980). 
 258. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 540 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 259. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 431 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1977). 
 260.  Id. at 1072.  Plaintiffs were not allowed to add allegations of Montedison’s 
“brainwashing” or exerting improper influence on patent examiners, however.  Id. at 1071. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] ALLOCATING PATENT RIGHTS BETWEEN EARLIER AND LATER INVENTIONS 91 
polypropylene.261  The district court determined the date of priority for 
Montedison to be June 8, 1954, which was the date that Natta filed his patent 
application with the Italian Patent Office.262  Although Natta did not file his 
United States patent application until June 8, 1955, the United States patent 
application related back to the filing of the Italian patent application pursuant 
to 35 U.S.C. § 119, because Natta filed the United States patent application 
within one year of the filing of the Italian patent application.263 
The district court based the date of priority for Phillips on the original 
filing of the Hogan and Banks patent application on January 27, 1953.264  
While Phillips abandoned the 1953 patent application when it filed its 
continuation-in-part application on January 11, 1956, the date of priority for 
the continuation-in-part application related back to the date of the original 
patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 120 with respect to any disclosures made 
in the original patent application.265  In order for the 1956 continuation-in-part 
application to relate back to 1953, though, the 1953 disclosure would have to 
satisfy the enablement requirement for the invention.266  The Board of Patent 
Interferences had rejected the earlier date on the grounds that the 1953 patent 
application failed to disclose crystalline polypropylene and failed to disclose a 
utility for the material.267  The district court ruled, however, that the 1953 
application satisfied the requirements for the 1956 continuation-in-part 
application to relate back to 1953,268 because the 1953 application disclosed 
four experiments that Hogan and Banks conducted which produced solid 
propylene polymers with a substantially crystalline polypropylene content.269 
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On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.270  The appellate court began its 
analysis with the description of the invention in the interference count: 
“Normally solid polypropylene, consisting essentially of recurring propylene 
units, having a substantial crystalline polypropylene content.”271  It then parsed 
the phrases in the interference count one at a time.  Montedison and the other 
appellants “concede[d] that the 1953 application disclosed a solid 
polypropylene,” but challenged whether the polypropylene it disclosed 
consisted “essentially of recurring propylene units” and whether the 
polypropylene had “a substantial crystalline content.”272  The 1953 application 
did not expressly state that the material produced in Hogan and Banks’ 
experiments consisted of recurring propylene units,273 but the district court 
concluded that the application inherently disclosed this fact.274  The appellate 
court decided that this conclusion was supported by expert testimony that a 
polymer chemist, in 1953, would have recognized that polypropylene produced 
under the conditions of their experiments would consist of essentially recurring 
propylene units.275  The appellate court similarly agreed with the district 
court’s conclusion that the 1953 application inherently disclosed that the 
polypropylene was crystalline.276  It ruled this conclusion was supported by 
expert testimony that a skilled polymer chemist would have concluded the 
material was crystalline after reading the information in the disclosure that the 
material was not soluble in pentane at room temperature, as well as the data 
provided concerning the material’s melting temperature, viscosity, density, and 
molecular weight.277 
D. In re Hogan 
While the courts were reviewing the massive interference over the 
invention of polypropylene, a significant ruling was made on a related patent.  
The original Hogan and Banks patent application included claims for not only 
polypropylene but also for a solid polymer of another hydrocarbon called 4-
methyl-1-pentene (C6H12), which has the repeating chemical structure shown 
below.278 
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Figure 7.  Structure of 4-methyl-1-pentene279 
After the action to review the interference was filed in the district court, 
Phillips decided to divide the claims for polypropylene and 4-methyl-1-pentene 
into separate patent applications by filing divisional applications pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 121 for the separate inventions.280  The Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) rejected claims 13–15 in the successor to the divisional application 
for 4-methyl-1-pentene.281  Claim 13 was for “[a] normally solid homopolymer 
of 4-methyl-1-pentene,” and claims 14 and 15 were narrower dependent claims 
that incorporated claim 13 by reference.282  Among the grounds that the patent 
examiner gave for rejecting these claims was that the claims for the polymer 
were broader than the scope of enablement, because they included other 
species of the polymer that were the subjects of subsequent patents.283  The 
Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the PTO’s rejection of the claims.284  Among 
the reasons given by the Board was that the disclosure in the original 1953 
Hogan and Banks application was not enabling, because the disclosure was 
limited to making crystalline polymers but the claims the Board was rejecting 
“encompasse[d] an amorphous polymer as well, which is manifestly outside 
the scope of the enabling teaching present in the case.”285 
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On appeal to the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals,286 the court reversed 
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals.287  The court ruled that the patent 
examiner and board erred by considering a later state of the art (i.e., patents 
filed after the filing of the 1953 application) to decide whether the claims 
satisfied the enablement requirement.288  The court reasoned: 
The PTO has not challenged appellants’ assertion that their 1953 application 
enabled those skilled in the art in 1953 to make and use “a solid polymer” as 
described in claim 13.  Appellants disclosed, as the only then existing way to 
make such a polymer, a method of making the crystalline form. To now say 
that appellants should have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on 
this record did not exist until 1962, would be to impose an impossible burden 
on inventors and thus on the patent system. There cannot, in an effective patent 
system, be such a burden placed on the right to broad claims. To restrict 
appellants to the crystalline form disclosed, under such circumstances, would 
be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early 
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad 
protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both shortsighted and unsound from 
the standpoint of promoting progress in the useful arts, the constitutional 
purpose of the patent laws.289 
The court appears to have envisioned the situation that claim 13 for a solid 
polymer covered two forms for it: a crystalline form that was enabled by the 
specification of the 1953 application and an amorphous form that was not 
enabled because it was discovered later.290  Since it seemed to the court that the 
amorphous form did not exist at the time of the patent application, the patentee 
could not have been expected to claim the amorphous form at that time.291 
These circumstances were distinguishable from those in Consolidated 
Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,292 because the patentees in the 
latter case were aware when they filed their application that some types of 
carbon made from vegetable fibrous materials would not work in their 
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invention as well as the carbonized paper that they described in the 
specification, and also that there were other vegetable fibrous materials that 
they had not tested.293  In Consolidated Electric Light Co., the broad claim for 
carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material did not satisfy the enablement 
requirement under the state of the art as that was known at the time of the 
filing of the patent application.294  In contrast, under the court’s view of the 
circumstances in the Hogan case, the broad claim for a solid polymer did 
satisfy the enablement requirement under the state of the art as that was known 
at the time of the filing of the patent application, because the amorphous form 
was not yet known.295  It is not clear, however, why this distinction should 
make a difference.  While Phillips may not have known that there was any 
difference between a claim for a solid polymer and a crystalline form for a 
solid polymer, because the existence of an amorphous polymer was not known 
at that time under the court’s view of the state of the art in 1953, Phillips could 
have limited its claim to the crystalline form for the solid polymer, if that is 
what it disclosed in the specification.296 
The Hogan decision continued: 
  Consideration of a later existing state of the art in testing for compliance 
with § 112, first paragraph, would not only preclude the grant of broad claims, 
but would wreak havoc in other ways as well.  The use of a subsequently-
existing improvement to show lack of enablement in an earlier-filed 
application on the basic invention would preclude issuance of a patent to the 
inventor of the thing improved, and in the case of issued patents, would 
invalidate all claims (even some “picture claims”) therein.  Patents are and 
should be granted to later inventors upon unobvious improvements. Indeed, 
encouragement of improvements on prior inventions is a major contribution of 
the patent system and the vast majority of patents are issued on improvements.  
It is quite another thing, however, to utilize the patenting or publication of later 
existing improvements to “reach back” and preclude or invalidate a patent on 
the underlying invention.297 
The references to “broad claims” in this and the previously quoted paragraph 
suggest approval of Professor Kitch’s prospect theory of patents.298  The court 
did not explain, however, why restricting the scope of protection to the 
disclosure in the specification “would be a poor way to stimulate invention, 
and particularly to encourage its early disclosure.”299  As the concurring 
opinion by Judge Miller pointed out, the majority’s decision to extend the 
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scope of protection to future technology would arguably impede rather than 
advance progress.300  Judge Miller explained that the effect of the majority’s 
decision was to relegate future inventions to a subservient position with respect 
to the original invention merely because the inventor used a term that the 
inventor thought was limited to a single species, but later turned out to have a 
broader meaning.301  In addition, the court did not explain why patent 
protection should extend to forms of materials that are unknown at the time of 
the filing of a patent, but not to any other forms of materials that a patentee 
might want to claim under a prospect theory of patents.302 
Next, the court addressed concerns with invalidating a patent on 
enablement grounds because of the subsequent discovery of a product that it 
did not enable: 
  If applications were to be tested for enablement under § 112 in the light of 
a later existing state of the art, the question would arise over how much later.  
An examiner could never safely call a halt and pass an application to issue.  
One who had slavishly copied the disclosed and claimed invention of a patent 
issued in 1965, for example, could resist an infringement action by insisting 
that a court hold the patent invalid because it was not enabling with respect to 
some third product which first came into existence, and thus came within the 
purview of the claim, in 1975.303 
The answer to this concern is that if future developments caused a claim to be 
overbroad, the patentee could obtain reissuance of the patent under § 251 and 
restrict the claim to the scope of enablement.304 
Lastly, the court responded to the PTO’s concern about the possibility of 
subsequent infringement actions against later inventors as follows: 
  The PTO position, that claim 13 is of sufficient breadth to cover the later 
state of the art (amorphous polymers) shown in the “references,” reflects a 
concern that allowance of claim 13 might lead to enforcement efforts against 
the later developers.  Any such conjecture, if it exists, is both irrelevant and 
unwarranted.  The business of the PTO is patentability, not infringement. Like 
the judicially-developed doctrine of equivalents, designed to protect the 
patentee with respect to later-developed variations of the claimed invention, 
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the judicially-developed “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” requiring 
interpretation of claims in light of the specification, may be safely relied upon 
to preclude improper enforcement against later developers.  The courts have 
consistently considered subsequently existing states of the art as raising 
questions of infringement, but never of validity. It is, of course, a major and 
infinitely important function of the PTO to insure that those skilled in the art 
are enabled, as of the filing date, to practice the invention claimed.  If, in the 
light of all proper evidence, the invention claimed be clearly enabled as of that 
date, the inquiry under § 112, first paragraph, is at an end.305 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Miller characterized the majority as 
applying a double standard by interpreting claims in light of the state of the art 
at the time of filing for purposes of enablement, but interpreting them in light 
of the later state of the art for purposes of infringement.306  He urged that 
instead of employing a double standard, the PTO should simply interpret the 
claims in light of the state of the art at the time of filing to determine whether 
they satisfy the enablement requirement.307  Judge Miller reasoned that in the 
case of a claim for a solid homopolymer, if a person of ordinary skill in the art 
at the time of filing would have interpreted it to include both amorphous and 
crystalline forms, and only the crystalline form was enabled, then the claim 
should be rejected for extending beyond the scope of enablement.308  On the 
other hand, if a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted the 
claim to include only the crystalline form, the claim should be allowed and 
limited to the crystalline form.309 
The majority’s reliance on the reverse doctrine of equivalents to protect 
later developers from “improper enforcement”310 is problematic.  The reverse 
doctrine of equivalents arose in case law as a defense to an infringement action 
where a device came within the literal scope of a claim, but it was “so far 
changed in principle from a patented article that it perform[ed] the same or a 
similar function in a substantially different way . . . .”311  The Federal Circuit 
has described this defense, however, as an “anachronistic exception, long 
mentioned but rarely applied,”312 and it has never affirmed a decision in which 
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the defense had succeeded at trial.313  Moreover, the courts have not 
demarcated the limits of this defense clearly, if it actually still exists.  
Consequently, later developers cannot expect the same protection from the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents as they could expect from rigorous enforcement 
of the enablement requirement to limit the scope of claims to the disclosure in 
the specification as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals relied on the Hogan decision 
three years later in In re Koller.314  In Koller, the patent examiner rejected a 
claim for a process of producing a desired chemical from a precursor chemical 
in which one of the steps involved mixing the precursor chemical with metal 
salts in a “liquid medium.”315  Whether the claim was valid depended upon its 
priority date, and this issue turned on whether the patent application related 
back to the filing of the grandparent application, which also referred to mixing 
in a “liquid medium.”316  The patent examiner based the claim’s rejection on 
the failure of the disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to use 
solvents that were not miscible (i.e., capable of being mixed to form a single 
homogeneous substance) with water at the time the grandparent application 
was filed.317  The court decided that the case paralleled Hogan because at the 
time the grandparent application was filed, a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would not have recognized that solvents which were not miscible with water 
would be suitable for the patented process.318  Therefore, such a person would 
not have included them within the scope of the term “liquid medium.”319  So 
under Hogan, the enablement requirement was satisfied, because the disclosure 
enabled mixing with the only types of solvents that were recognized at the 
time—i.e., solvents that would mix with water.320  The court thus reversed the 
decision of the Board of Appeals to affirm the examiner’s rejection of the 
claim. 
E. Enforcement of the Hogan and Banks Patent 
After the Third Circuit’s decision on the polypropylene interference 
proceeding, the Hogan and Banks patent issued on March 15, 1983, over 
twenty-seven years after the application was filed.  The enforcement phase of 
the litigation then began with Phillips filing infringement actions against a 
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number of companies. After obtaining licenses from Phillips to settle the 
infringement actions, the infringement defendants filed an action against 
Phillips, seeking declaratory relief that the Hogan and Banks patent was 
invalid, not infringed, and unenforceable.321  In an eighty-one page opinion, the 
district court held that the patent was valid and infringed.322 
On the issue of enablement, the court observed that the infringement 
defendants did not dispute that the 1953 application enabled a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to make polypropylene that satisfied all the elements of 
its single claim: “Normally solid polypropylene consisting essentially of 
recurring propylene units, having a substantial crystalline polypropylene 
content.”323  The defendants argued, though, that the application did not 
describe or enable the entire class of compounds that came within the claim.324  
Focusing on the intrinsic viscosity of 0.2 to 1.0 and the weight average 
molecular weight of 5000 to 20,000 given in the specification,325 the 
defendants asserted that the application disclosed only polypropylene that was 
useless as a plastic for commercial applications and “was little more than a low 
molecular weight, brittle laboratory curiosity.”326  They also contended that 
“the 1953 application does not enable one to produce the high molecular 
weight, tough polypropylenes of commerce.”327  Although the district court 
acknowledged that “some of the market success of crystalline polypropylene 
can be credited to higher molecular weights not attributable to the Hogan and 
Banks invention,”328 it ruled that the 1953 application satisfied the written 
description and enablement requirements.329  The opinion found that the 
defendants missed the point of the inquiry under § 112, which was to 
determine whether the “claimed” invention was described and enabled, and 
that it was not necessary for a patent applicant “to predict every possible 
variation, improvement or commercial embodiment of his invention.”330  The 
court explained that since the claim did not include any limitations regarding 
intrinsic viscosity or molecular weight, these factors were not relevant to the 
written description and enablement requirements.331  It concluded that 
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regardless of whether the defendants had a superior product to the 
polypropylene described in the 1953 application, it was still crystalline 
polypropylene that came within the claims of the patents.332 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court.333  The 
defendants argued that the claim was too broad because it embraced subject 
matter that lacked an adequate basis in the 1953 application.334  Relying on the 
Hogan and Koller cases, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ 
arguments: 
  Defendants’ misdirected approach here is the same as that improperly 
relied upon by the PTO in Hogan.  Defendants do not, as they cannot, argue 
that the 1953 specification fails to enable one skilled in the art to practice the 
claimed invention.  That the ‘851 claim may cover a later version of the 
claimed composition (crystalline polyproplene [sic] with higher intrinsic 
viscosity and average molecular weight) relates to infringement, not to 
patentability.  To hold differently would, in the words of Hogan, “impose an 
impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system.”335 
The appellate court continued, stating, “the central flaw [with] defendants’ 
evidence . . . [was] that it was directed solely to a later state of the art.”336  The 
appellate court also rejected the defendants’ argument under the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents, saying that the defendants provided no legal basis or 
equitable grounds, and it saw none “for restricting the coverage of the claim to 
less than its admitted literal scope.”337  With the Federal Circuit’s decision, 
more than thirty years of polypropylene litigation came to an end. 
Although the Federal Circuit did not explain its decision in these terms, the 
decision can be understood as an example of a blocking patent in which an 
improvement to a prior invention consists of a combination of a component 
with the prior invention.338  The essential difference between the 
polypropylene disclosed in the Hogan and Banks patent application and the 
higher molecular weight polypropylene made with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts 
was that the polypropylene made with the Ziegler-Natta catalysts had longer 
polypropylene chains.  The longer polypropylene chains made with the 
Ziegler-Natta catalysts (i.e., A + B) were simply the product of combining 
shorter polypropylene chains (i.e., A) with additional polypropylene units (i.e., 
B).  Thus, the manufacture of the higher molecular weight polypropylene with 
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the Ziegler-Natta catalysts necessarily entailed infringement of the Hogan and 
Banks patent. 
Nevertheless, the end result of allowing Phillips’ patent to dominate 
Natta’s is troubling from the standpoint of the most appropriate allocation of 
intellectual property rights.  Natta’s contribution surely was greater than that 
made by Hogan and Banks.  Even today, most polypropylene is produced 
using the Ziegler-Natta catalysts.339  Because of its high molecular weight, the 
polypropylene produced with Ziegler-Natta catalysts has the toughness, 
flexibility, and other desirable characteristics that have made it a success in the 
marketplace.  In contrast, the polypropylene produced with the Marlex 
catalysts described in the Hogan and Banks patent is brittle and has never been 
a successful commercial product.340  And the synthesis by Hogan and Banks of 
their crystalline polypropylene in 1953 did not make the development by Natta 
in 1954 of crystalline polypropylene using the Ziegler-Natta catalysts possible, 
nor did it make it either cheaper or faster.341  Because Natta was not aware of 
Hogan and Banks’ work until later, Hogan and Banks did not contribute in any 
way to Natta’s invention.  Furthermore, there is no indication that Hogan and 
Banks or the other chemists at Phillips understood the mechanism for the 
production of crystalline polypropylene through the lining up of the methyl 
groups on the same side of the carbon chain until after Natta’s publication of 
his experimental results and theoretical explanation in the Journal of the 
American Chemical Society in 1955.342  Moreover, Phillips claimed crystalline 
polypropylene only after learning of Natta’s publication.  The payoff that 
Phillips would have needed in order to recover the costs of the Hogan and 
Banks invention was minimal since their discovery of polypropylene was 
accidental in contrast to the focused activity of Ziegler and Natta in producing 
crystalline polypropylene.343 
In spite of all these reasons for minimizing the allocation of intellectual 
property rights to Phillips, the Hogan and Banks patent was awarded priority 
over Natta’s patent.  Phillips was able to collect $300 million in licensing 
revenues from polypropylene manufacturers through 1995344 even though the 
manufacturers did not use the Marlex catalysts described in the 1953 Hogan 
and Banks application, because the Ziegler-Natta catalysts produced superior 
quality polypropylene than that produced using the Marlex catalysts. 
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The polypropylene litigation also spawned a peculiar legal precedent for 
the enablement requirement that contributed to the outcome of the litigation.  
Under this precedent, a patentee would be permitted to claim a genus that 
includes unknown species that are discovered in the future if the specification 
describes and enables all the species that are known at the time of filing the 
patent application.  This result is achieved through what Professors Merges and 
Duffy characterize as the “temporal paradox,” where the description and 
enablement requirements for the genus are determined as of the date of filing 
the patent, and the patentee gets the benefit of any additions to the genus 
discovered later. 345  A line of Federal Circuit decisions from the past several 
years indicates this peculiar precedent has been eroded, however.  The next 
section of the article discusses these cases. 
IV.  RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAW 
As discussed previously, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held in 
In re Hogan,346 that a patent application that disclosed and enabled a method of 
making the crystalline form of a polymer was entitled to a claim for the 
method of making a solid polymer, because the only known method for 
making a solid polymer at the time was the application’s method of making the 
crystalline form.347  While the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals followed 
Hogan in In re Koller348 and the Federal Circuit followed it in U.S. Steel Corp. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,349 the Federal Circuit has limited Hogan in Plant 
Genetic System, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,350 and has virtually eliminated 
Hogan’s effect in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.351  One circuit panel cannot 
overrule a decision of an earlier panel,352 but a panel in a subsequent case may 
interpret earlier precedent either expansively or narrowly, and the Federal 
Circuit appears to have drastically narrowed Hogan’s scope as a precedent.  
Since Chiron, the Federal Circuit has not referred to Hogan in any of its cases 
that involved claims to a genus where only a single species was enabled.353 
 
 345. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39. 
 346. 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 347. See supra text accompanying note 289. 
 348. 613 F.2d 819, 823–24 (Fed. Cir. 1980). 
 349. 865 F.2d 1247, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 350. 315 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 351. 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 352. See, e.g., LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“One three-
judge panel . . .  does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.”). 
 353. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. 
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] ALLOCATING PATENT RIGHTS BETWEEN EARLIER AND LATER INVENTIONS 103 
The Plant Genetic Systems case was concerned with genetically engineered 
corn.354  The plaintiff had a patent for plants genetically engineered to resist a 
type of herbicide that killed other plants by blocking an essential biochemical 
process in them.355  The specification provided working examples of tomato, 
potato, and tobacco plants that were genetically engineered to resist the 
herbicides.356  Generally, flowering plants are categorized as either 
monocotyledons (“monocots”), dicotyledons (“dicots”), or polycotyledons 
(“polycots”), depending on whether they have one, two, or more than two 
leaves in their initial growth from seeds.357  All of the working examples in the 
specification were for plants that were dicots, but the claims were not limited 
to dicots and broadly covered all plants.358  The defendant’s accused product 
was corn, a monocot, which had been genetically engineered to resist the 
particular herbicides with which the plaintiff’s patent was concerned.359  The 
district court heard extensive testimony on the state of the art of genetic 
engineering at the time of filing of the patent and found clear and convincing 
evidence of a “monocot barrier,” which would have prevented a person of 
ordinary skill in the art from making genetically engineered monocots without 
undue experimentation.360  The district court accordingly ruled that the patent’s 
broad claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement 
because they were not limited to dicots.361 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.362  The 
patentee argued that Hogan required reversal, but the Federal Circuit ruled that 
Hogan did not apply: 
  We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was 
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed, 
unless the patent discloses how to make and use it.  In Hogan, amorphous 
propylene [sic], on the record before the court, was not known or in existence 
when the application was filed.  In the present case, however, monocots 
existed in 1987 and stably-transformed monocot cells were highly desirable.  
PGS indeed asserts that monocot cells were already being stably transformed.  
Thus, monocots and stably transformed monocot cells were not an unknown 
concept that came into existence only after 1987.  But stably transformed 
 
 354. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 246, 250 (D. Conn. 
2001). 
 355. Id. at 251. 
 356. Id. at 252. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Plant Genetic, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
 360. Id. at 261. 
 361. Id. at 270. 
 362. Plant Genetic Sys. N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
104 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:55 
monocot cells were difficult to produce, and the ‘236 patent gave no 
instruction how.363 
The court’s statement in Hogan that “amorphous propylene . . . was not 
known” is inaccurate for several reasons.  First, propylene is a gas at room 
temperature, and therefore, it surely was amorphous, rather than crystalline; of 
course, propylene was well known when the 1953 Hogan and Banks filed their 
application.  Second, if the court was referring to polypropylene, rather than 
propylene, the court’s statement is still incorrect, because Hogan dealt with a 
divisional patent application for 4-methyl-1-pentene, rather than the patent for 
polypropylene.364  Finally, the patent specification in Hogan characterized 
amorphous polymers as prior art, and therefore, they were not unknown at the 
time the application was filed.365 
Because of all these factual errors, it is difficult to understand exactly what 
distinction the Plant Genetic court was trying to make between Hogan and the 
case before it.  Certainly, monocots and stably transformed monocot cells were 
not an unknown concept in 1987, but neither was “amorphous propylene” (or 
whatever the Plant Genetic court meant to refer to) an unknown concept in 
1953.  If the Plant Genetic court intended to limit the reach of Hogan to 
species that were nonexistent and unknown even as a concept at the time of 
filing of a patent application, then Hogan would be a very narrow precedent.  It 
would be difficult to show that a species was an unknown concept at the time a 
claim to the genus was filed, because it is much easier to have a concept for an 
invention than it is to reduce an invention to practice.366  Conceivably what the 
Plant Genetic court had in mind, however, was that Hogan permits a claim to a 
genus to encompass a species that was not enabled in a patent specification 
only if the species did not exist at the time the specification was filed.  If the 
species did exist at the time the specification was filed, but was difficult to 
produce, the species would be anticipated,367 and therefore a claim to the 
species would be invalid.  The Plant Genetic court could not have meant 
merely that the species did not exist, because the species would not have been 
patentable if it already existed.  Instead the court must have meant that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would have required substantially more than 
undue experimentation to make the species in order for a claim to a genus to 
encompass the species if it was not enabled in a patent specification. It is not 
clear how much undue experimentation should be required, however. 
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The last case involving the patentability of inventions in which the Federal 
Circuit referred to Hogan is Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.368  The Chiron 
case involved a patent for an antibody that bound itself to the human antigen 
associated with breast cancer cells; by binding to the antigen, the antibody 
facilitated the detection and treatment of breast cancer.369  The antibody was 
the subject of an original patent application filed in 1984 and two continuation-
in-part applications filed in 1985 and 1986.370  The first application disclosed a 
type of antibody called a murine antibody, which was derived from mouse 
cells by cloning them.371  Murine antibodies have the disadvantage that they 
are not suitable for long-term treatment of humans, because they create a risk 
of an immunological response that can cause toxic shock or even death on 
account of the antibodies having been derived from animal cells.372 
Recombinant DNA technology has been used to produce other types of 
antibodies that include chimeric antibodies and humanized antibodies, in 
which part of the DNA encoding regions come from humans.373  Chimeric 
antibodies and humanized antibodies are more suitable for long-term treatment 
of humans than murine antibodies, because they have less nonhuman 
content.374  The first publication to disclose chimeric antibodies appeared four 
months after the filing of the first application in 1984, and the first publication 
to disclose humanized antibodies appeared in 1986.375 
The two continuation-in-part applications were filed after chimeric 
antibody technology and humanized antibody technology, respectively, had 
become known in the biotechnology field.  Although neither of the 
continuation-in-part applications disclosed chimeric or humanized antibodies, 
they included a broad definition of “antibody” not found in the 1984 
application, which stated that it was “not intended to be limited as regards the 
source of the antibody or the manner in which it is made.”376 
When the patent finally issued, Chiron sued Genentech on account of 
Genentech’s sales of a humanized antibody that was used in the long-term 
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treatment of breast cancer.377  The case was tried to a jury, which determined 
that neither the original nor continuation-in-part applications satisfied the 
written description and enablement requirements with respect to a claim for 
chimeric or humanized antibodies.378  The verdict form, however, did not 
specify which of the two requirements was not satisfied.379 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit broke the enablement requirement into three 
categories based on the knowledge available at the time of the filing of a patent 
application.  First, it found that at one end of the spectrum, a patent application 
preferably should not disclose routine technology that was well known to one 
of ordinary skill in the art.380  Second, citing Hogan, the court noted that, at the 
other end of the spectrum, a patent application is not required to enable 
technology that arises after its filing, because that would be impossible.381  
Third, the court found that an enabling disclosure is required only for nascent 
technology for which a person of ordinary skill in the art would need 
instruction from the application to practice the invention.382 
The court then applied these principles to the three patent applications.  It 
ruled that the 1984 application was outside of the bounds of the enablement 
requirement, because the technology for making chimeric antibodies did not 
arise until after the filing of the application.383  In contrast, by the time of the 
filing of the 1985 and 1986 continuation-in-part applications, the technology 
for making chimeric antibodies had become nascent technology.384  
Consequently, the continuation-in-part applications were subject to the 
enablement requirement, and the court found that substantial evidence 
supported the jury’s decision that their specifications did not enable the claims 
for chimeric and humanized antibodies without undue experimentation.385 
Although the Chiron majority decided that the 1984 application was not 
subject to the enablement requirement, it nevertheless affirmed the verdict on 
account of the written description requirement.386  The court noted that the 
function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor 
had possession of the subject matter of the patent when the application was 
filed, and that the Chiron scientists could not have had possession of chimeric 
antibodies because they were not developed until later.387  A concurring 
 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1252. 
 380. Id. at 1254. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1255. 
 385. Id. at 1256–57. 
 386. Id. at 1255. 
 387. Id. 
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opinion by Judge Bryson urged that the jury verdict should have been upheld 
with respect to the original 1984 application as well as the 1985 and 1986 
continuation-in-part applications for lack of enablement.388 
Chiron’s ruling regarding the written description requirement appears to 
negate the effect of Hogan entirely.  Whenever it would be impossible for a 
patent application to enable an unknown species of a genus, so that Hogan 
would take the disclosure out of the enablement requirement, then it would 
also be impossible for the patent application to describe the unknown species.  
Thus, the written description requirement places the same impossible burden 
on a patent applicant seeking to claim a genus that includes an unknown 
species that an enablement requirement would have, were it not for Hogan.  
While Hogan provides relief from this impossible burden with respect to the 
enablement requirement, Chiron provides no such relief with respect to the 
written description requirement.  Thus, Chiron renders claims that extend to 
unknown species invalid for failure to satisfy the written description 
requirement rather than the enablement requirement.  Whether a patent is 
invalid for failure to satisfy one requirement or the other, the end result is the 
same. 
The Federal Circuit next addressed the issue of the validity of a claim to a 
genus based on the disclosure of a species within the genus in Lizardtech, Inc. 
v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.389  Lizardtech had a patent for data 
compression software for digital images that included a claim for a method of 
creating a seamless digital wave transform (“DWT”) of the image data and 
then processing the data to permit storage of the transformed image in a 
computer with a limited memory.390  The specification disclosed one way to 
create the seamless DWT, which was by “maintaining updated sums” of DWT 
coefficients calculated from the image data.391  But the claim in issue did not 
specify how the seamless DWT was created, and therefore, it purported to 
cover all ways of creating the seamless DWT.392 
The Federal Circuit decided that there was no support for such a broad 
claim in the specification, because it failed to demonstrate that the inventor 
possessed the full scope of the claim and failed to enable the full breadth of the 
claim.  It explained: 
 
 388. Id. at 1261–63 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 389. 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 390. Id. at 1337.  For a thorough and insightful description of the factual background of the 
case, see Merges, supra note 153. 
 391. Lizardtech, 424 F.3d at 1340. 
 392. Id. at 1340–41.  Another of the claims included the “maintaining updated sums” 
limitation, but the court had ruled that the defendant had not infringed that claim because the 
defendant used an alternative method for creating the seamless DWT.  Id.  Lizardtech then argued 
that the defendant infringed the broader claim.  See id. at 1343. 
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  By analogy, suppose that an inventor created a particular fuel-efficient 
automobile engine and described the engine in such detail in the specification 
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to build the engine.  
Although the specification would meet the requirements of section 112 with 
respect to a claim directed to that particular engine, it would not necessarily 
support a broad claim to every possible type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter 
how different in structure or operation from the inventor’s engine.  The single 
embodiment would support such a generic claim only if the specification 
would “reasonably convey to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had 
possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing,” and would 
“enable one of ordinary skill to practice ‘the full scope of the claimed 
invention,’” . . . . To hold otherwise would violate the Supreme Court’s 
directive that “[i]t seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to 
the patentee and the public, than that the former should understand, and 
correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.”  
Thus, a patentee cannot always satisfy the requirements of section 112, in 
supporting expansive claim language, merely by clearly describing one 
embodiment of the thing claimed.  For that reason, we hold that the description 
of one method for creating a seamless DWT does not entitle the inventor of the 
‘835 patent to claim any and all means for achieving that objective.393 
It is significant that the court did not address whether alternatives to 
creating a seamless DWT were known at the time of filing the patent 
application, because in the Plant Genetics case the Federal Circuit relied on the 
knowledge of the other members (i.e., genetically engineered monocots) of the 
claimed genus (i.e., genetically engineered plants) to distinguish it from 
Hogan.394  The Lizardtech decision did not refer to either the Hogan or Plant 
Genetic cases. 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.395 is another case in which the 
Federal Circuit held claims invalid for lack of enablement due to lack of 
support in the specification.  The patent was for power fluid injectors used to 
inject fluids into patients during medical procedures.396  Although all the 
examples in the specification included a pressure jacket on the injectors, the 
claims did not require the injectors to have a pressure jacket.397  The district 
court determined that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement of 
 
 393. Id. at 1346 (citations omitted). 
 394. See supra text accompanying note 363. 
 395. 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 396. Id. at 1373. 
 397. Id. at 1374.  When the original patent application was filed, the claims included the 
limitation of a pressure jacket on the injectors, but the patentee removed this limitation from the 
claims during patent prosecution after learning that the defendant was making a jacketless injector 
system.  Id. 
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injectors without a pressure jacket, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.398  The 
appellate court explained: 
[I]n this case, the asserted claims read on, and the full scope of the claimed 
invention includes, an injector system with and without a pressure jacket.  
There must be “reasonable enablement of the scope of the range” which, in this 
case, includes both injector systems with and without a pressure jacket.399 
The Federal Circuit also found claims invalid for lack of enablement 
because they extended beyond the specification in Automotive Technologies 
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.400  The case involved crash 
sensors for use in deploying airbags during side impact car accidents which 
were triggered by a vehicle’s velocity changes upon exceeding a threshold 
value.401  The claims did not specify the particular types of sensors to be used 
in the invention, but the specification had a detailed description of a 
mechanical velocity sensor and a briefer description of an electronic sensor.402  
The district court decided that the claims were invalid with respect to 
electronic sensors, because the description of them in the specification was not 
sufficiently detailed to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make 
them.403 
The Federal Circuit affirmed and explained: 
  We also reject ATI’s argument that because the specification enables one 
mode of practicing the invention, viz., mechanical side impact sensors, the 
enablement requirement is satisfied.  We addressed and rejected a similar 
argument made in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) . . . . 
  Similarly, in this case, the claim construction of the relevant claim 
limitation resulted in the scope of the claims including both mechanical and 
electronic side impact sensors.  Disclosure of only mechanical side impact 
sensors does not permit one skilled in the art to make and use the invention as 
broadly as it was claimed, which includes electronic side impact sensors.  
Electronic side impact sensors are not just another known species of a genus 
consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly different sensor compared with the 
well-enabled mechanical side impact sensor that is fully discussed in the 
specification.  Thus, in order to fulfill the enablement requirement, the 
specification must enable the full scope of the claims that includes both 
 
 398. Id. at 1375, 1378. 
 399. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380.  The court also pointed out that it was ironic that the 
plaintiff had successfully argued that the claims encompassed injectors with no pressure jackets, 
but lost the case in the end because the broad claims were invalid for lack of enablement.  Id. 
 400. 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 401. Id. at 1276–77. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 1280. 
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electronic and mechanical side impact sensors, which the specification fails to 
do.404 
The Federal Circuit’s most recent case on the enablement of a claim to a 
genus is Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC.405  Sitrick had two patents for integrating 
a user’s audio signal or visual image into a pre-existing video game or 
movie.406  Sitrick sued Dreamworks for infringement of these patents on 
account of Dreamworks’s including in the DVDs it made and distributed a 
feature called ReVoice Studio that allowed users to add their own voices to the 
movies on the DVDs.407  Sitrick’s patents included claims for the integration or 
substitution of a visual or audio user image in place of a predefined image in a 
presentation.408  The specifications “described the ‘integration’ or 
‘substitution’ as being performed by an ‘Intercept Adapter Interface System’ 
(IAIS),” which is used “[i]n a video game system . . . to intercept address 
signals . . . [between] the video game apparatus and . . . the game card or 
storage card.”409  The claims were not restricted to video games, however, and 
the specification of one of the patents began: “[T]his invention relates to 
predefined video and audiovisual presentations such as movies and video 
games.”410 
The district court found all the claims invalid for lack of enablement as to 
movies, because the patent specifications did not explain how the IAIS from a 
video game system would work for movies.  It noted that Dreamworks’ experts 
had testified that video games differed significantly from movies, because in 
video games, the images of the various characters in the story were retrieved 
by discrete address signals, while the images of the characters in pre-existing 
movies were inseparable from the surrounding images.  Consequently, the 
techniques for intercepting address signals for video games had no relevance to 
movies, and the disclosure did not enable use of the IAIS for movies.411  In 
affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit held: 
  The full scope of the claimed invention must be enabled.  The rationale for 
this statutory requirement is straightforward.  Enabling the full scope of each 
claim is “part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain.” A patentee who 
chooses broad claim language must make sure the broad claims are fully 
enabled. “The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the 
enablement” to “ensure[ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent 
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specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the 
claims.”412 
The Lizardtech, Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick 
cases each dealt with a claim to a genus based on a specification that enabled 
only one species in the genus.  In each case, the Federal Circuit emphasized 
that a claim to a genus would not satisfy the enablement requirement if the 
specification enabled only a single species; instead, the specification was 
required to enable the full scope of the claim.  None of these cases referred to 
Hogan or addressed whether the enablement requirement was not applicable 
on account of a species within the genus that was not known or in existence at 
the time of filing and therefore was impossible to enable then.  In light of the 
limitation on Hogan in Plant Genetic that a species must have been an 
“unknown concept that came into existence only after” the filing of the patent 
specification to avoid the enablement requirement, and the holding in the 
Chiron case that a claim to a genus would not satisfy the written description 
requirement with respect to an unknown species, it appears that there is little 
left of Hogan as a precedent.413 
CONCLUSION 
The allocation of intellectual property rights between earlier and later 
inventors of related technology involves inevitable tradeoffs.  To the extent 
that an earlier inventor receives a blocking patent with respect to after-arising 
technology that a later inventor makes, the later inventor may lack the 
appropriate incentive to create the after-arising technology.  But if the earlier 
inventor is not allowed a blocking patent with respect to the after-arising 
technology, the earlier inventor may lack the appropriate incentive to create the 
original invention on which the after-arising technology depends. 
It would seem that the optimal allocation of the intellectual property rights 
in after-arising technology between the earlier and later inventors should 
depend on their relative contributions and the effect that the allocation of 
intellectual property rights would have on their respective incentives.  Instead 
of basing the allocation on these types of particularized considerations, 
however, the patent law uses broad, across-the-board rules.  The first is that a 
patent on an original invention (A) will dominate a patent on an improvement 
that involves a combination of the original invention with an additional 
component (A+B).  Although the later inventor may receive a patent for the 
improvement, that patent is blocked by the patent on the original invention, 
and the earlier inventor’s permission is required for the later inventor to 
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2003). 
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practice the patent on the improvement.  The second is that a patent on a 
product will dominate a later patent on a process for making or using the 
product. 
Beyond these instances of blocking patents, several cases beginning with 
In re Hogan ruled that an earlier inventor of a single species was entitled to a 
broad claim to a genus if that species was the only member of the genus in 
existence at the time of the patent application, and then the patent would 
dominate later patents for other species within the genus that were developed 
later. 
The doctrinal basis for Hogan was that the enablement requirement for 
patentability is tested at the time of filing the patent application, and that the 
scope of a patent could extend to after-arising technology that was within the 
broad claim to the genus that included a species which the patent’s disclosure 
enabled.  The holding in Hogan appears to have been eroded by recent Federal 
Circuit decisions, though.  First, the Federal Circuit limited Hogan in Plant 
Genetic System, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. to circumstances where the 
after-arising technology was not merely difficult to produce, but was instead an 
unknown concept.414  Then, in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit held that even if a claim to a genus could satisfy the enablement 
requirement with respect to the after-arising technology, the claim would 
nevertheless be invalid because it could not satisfy the written description 
requirement.415  Since Chiron was decided, Hogan has not been cited in any of 
the four cases where the Federal Circuit has ruled that patents with broad 
claims did not satisfy the enablement and written description requirements 
because their patent specifications did not support the full range of the claims. 
The loss of Hogan as a precedent seems warranted from an economic 
standpoint.  It is certainly possible that the invention of the first species in a 
genus would contribute to the development of other species in the genus.  It is 
likely, however, that this would not be so much of the time, and unless the 
invention of the first species contributed to the development of other species, 
intellectual property rights to the other species should not be allocated to the 
inventor of the first species in the genus.  Consequently, blocking patents 
should be limited to inventions involving combinations of an earlier invention 
with an additional component and processes for making or using a patented 
product. 
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